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I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) is a
voluntary association that includes 1,066 colleges and universities,1 in
which more than 430,000 students participate in intercollegiate sports.2
The NCAA has an enforcement program that imposes severe penalties on
member schools and student-athletes for noncompliance with NCAA
rules, which are reflected in its manual governing Division I sports.3
According to the manual, the primary purpose of the NCAA’s structure
and governing rules “is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program . . . [and] retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”4 The NCAA
achieves this desired demarcation by requiring “student-athletes to be
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived.”5 Student-athletes risk their amateur status, and
thus, their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics if they accept

1

See
About
the
NCAA,
NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
http://ncaa.org/about/who-we-are-membership) (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
2 Id.
3 National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
§ 2.8.1–2.8.3, at 4 (2013), available at, http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/D115.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Div. I Manual].
4
Id. § 1.3.1, at 1.
5 Id. § 2.9, at 4.
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compensation for their athletic skill or performance.6 Consequently, the
manual circumscribes all commercial opportunities available for current
and former student-athletes.
The Collegiate Licensing Company (the “CLC”), which serves as the
NCAA’s licensing agent,7 facilitates the licensing and marketing of
NCAA products to third-party enterprises. Marketing and licensing
NCAA products comprises a “$4.6 billion retail market for collegiate
licensed merchandise.”8 Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA Sports”) entered into
a six-year exclusive contract with CLC in 2005, which effectively gave
EA Sports a monopoly for the development and distribution of NCAA
video games.9 This contract provided EA Sports the exclusive right to
replicate NCAA teams, stadiums, uniforms, and mascots within its NCAA
video games.10 EA Sports derived significant commercial success from its
NCAA video games because of its ability to portray realistic depictions of
the various players and college teams providing a simulated experience
similar to participating in a real college football game.11 Because EA
Sports, pursuant to its exclusive agreement with CLC, agreed to comply
6

See id. § 12.1.2, at 59–60 (explaining amateur rules ensure that student-athletes: (1)
do not receive benefits that could be construed as remuneration for athletics participation,
(2) do not trade on their public standing as a student-athletes, and (3) are not exploited by
professional or commercial interests that would abridge their status as amateurs in their
sport).
7 About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last
visited Oct. 18, 2013).
8 Id.
9 Liron Offir, Article, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Game Industry Awoke to
Realize that Electronic Arts was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 91, 97 (2006); see
also Chris Morris, EA Secures College Football Rights, CNN MONEY (Apr. 11, 2005, 9:42
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/11/technology/personaltech/ea_ncaa/.
10 Id.
11 Third Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. at 131, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09–
1967, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1079 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Third Am.
Compl.] (describing how EA Sports undertook significant efforts to model each digital
avatar to mirror the respective student-athlete by matching: (1) the name of the real studentathlete; (2) his real-life jersey number; (3) his position played; (4) his hometown; (5) his
year of eligibility; (6) his athletic abilities (e.g., speed, strength, agility, etc); (7) his
physical characteristics; and (8) how he dressed for games in real life); see also Third
Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. at 89 (discussing users’ ability to download player
names: “In the most recent versions of its games for the Sony Play Station 3, EA
intentionally made the process of obtaining actual player names even easier by allowing
players to share rosters online using its ‘EA Locker’ feature. The EA Locker feature allows
gamers to upload rosters from other gamers while in the game itself. Prior to the EA Locker,
gamers had to download rosters from a computer, upload the files to the gaming console
and then transfer the rosters to the game. Now the gamer can obtain full NCAA rosters in
a matter of seconds without using a computer. Furthermore, numerous websites, such as
www.freencaa09rosters.com, keep a list of players who offer free NCAA rosters utilizing
the EA Locker feature.”).
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with the NCAA’s rules, EA Sports did not pay any current or former
student-athlete for the use of his name, image, and likeness in its NCAA
video games.12
While technological advancements foster the consistent commercial
expansion of college sports by creating new markets,13 the NCAA refuses
to amend its amateur rules precluding student-athletes from sharing in this
commercial revolution.14 The failure by the NCAA to act has led some
former student-athletes to take legal action.15 For instance, two former
quarterbacks, Samuel Keller and Ryan Hart, asserted individual right of
publicity claims against EA Sports, claiming that EA Sports
misappropriated their identity and likeness without their consent to
enhance the commercial value of its NCAA Football video game series.16
In both cases, EA Sports asserted First Amendment defenses, arguing that
its video games were protected as expressive speech.17
Courts have recognized that the First Amendment affords protection
to numerous forms of expressive speech, including written and spoken

12

Id. at 129–30.
See Kendall K. Johnson, Article, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 Sports Law. J. 1, 3
(2012).
14 Jeffrey L. Seglin, Should Colleges Pay Athletes to Play?, THE RIGHT THING (June
30, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2013/06/should-colleges-payathletes-to-play.html. (quoting Mark Emmert, the president of the NCAA), (“As long as
I’m president of the NCAA, we will not pay student-athletes to play sports. Compensation
for students is just something I’m adamantly opposed to. We’re providing athletes with
world class educations and world class opportunities. If they are one of the few that are
going to move on to become a pro athlete, there’s no better place in the world to refine
their skills as a student-athlete.”). But see Johnson, supra note 13, at 3 (criticizing the
NCAA’s hypocrisy, which is based on “[t]he [NCAA’s] often–stated contention that it is
protecting the players from ‘excessive commercialism’ is ludicrous; the only thing it’s
protecting is everyone else’s revenue stream.”).
15 See Hart Second Am. Compl., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., (Oct. 12, 2010), ECF No. 25.;
Keller Compl., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., (May 5, 2009), ECF No. 1.
16 Hart Second Am. Compl. 10-13; Keller Compl. 18.
17 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[EA Sports] contends
that the First Amendment shields it from liability for this violation because NCAA Football
is a protected work.”); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (“EA raises four
affirmative defenses derived from the First Amendment: the ‘transformative use’ test, the
Rogers test, the ‘public interest’ test, and the ‘public affairs’ exemption.”).
13
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words (fact or fiction),18 biographies,19 documentaries,20 docudramas,21
music,22 films,23 paintings,24 entertainment,25 whether or not sold for
profit,26 and other expressive works depicting real-life figures. In 2011,
the United States Supreme Court determined that video games are
protected as expressive speech under its First Amendment jurisprudence.27
Although the First Amendment’s free speech principles protect these
different forms and mediums of expression, such protections can be
limited in situations where the right of free speech necessarily conflicts
with other protected rights, such as the right of publicity.28
In the only Supreme Court decision to address the tension between
the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the Court held that when
state law publicity rights conflict with First Amendment rights, courts
must balance these competing interests.29 Because the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Co. did not
establish a specific test or legal standard for resolving this conflict between
the right of publicity and the First Amendment,30 the federal circuits have
18 See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 397 (Cal. 2001)
(quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 869 (Cal. 1979))
(Bird, C.J., concurring)) (“The right of publicity derived from public prominence does not
confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire.”).
19 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1994).
20 Ruffin-Steinback v. DePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730–31 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d,
267 F.3d 457, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001).
21 Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
22 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
23 Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
24 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973).
25 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (human cannonball
performance).
26 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967)) (“The First Amendment
is not limited to those who publish without charge. Whether the activity involves
newspaper publication or motion picture production, it does not lose its constitutional
protection because it is undertaken for profit.”).
27 See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“[V]ideo games
communicate ideas – and even social messages – through many familiar literary devices
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).”).
28 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75 (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to
be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is]
quite sure that the First . . . Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent”).
29 See id. (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media
reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is] quite sure that the
First . . . Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s
entire act without his consent”).
30 Id.

180

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:175

adopted different balancing tests to resolve the tension. In balancing the
tension between the right of publicity and the right to free speech, courts
have adopted four distinct legal methodologies: (1) a case-by-case
balancing approach; (2) the Predominant Use Test; (3) the Rogers Test;
and (4) the Transformative Use Test.31
This Comment analyzes the four different balancing approaches and
the Third and Ninth Circuit’s most recent application in Hart v. Elec. Arts
Inc.,32 and Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc.33 Specifically focusing on the video
game context, this Comment concludes that the Transformative Use Test
provides the most effective legal standard in resolving the tension
underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Part II
examines the origins of the right of publicity and its interplay with the First
Amendment.34 Part III discusses the case law developing different
standardized balancing tests that weigh the interests underlying the right
to free expression against the interests in protecting the right of publicity.35
Part IV describes why the Transformative Use Test is the proper legal
framework in the context of video games, as well as providing the proper
formulation and application of this balancing test.36
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE RISING
TENSION BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
“Every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has a right
to, but himself.”37
Courts have increasingly recognized the evolution of the right of
publicity as an intellectual property right that clashes with the First
Amendment. Part II analyzes the historical development of the right of
publicity, as well as the fundamental tensions between the interests
underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment. While Part II
A examines the general application of the right of publicity and its
historical origin, Part II B considers the conflicting interests underpinning
31 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996) (applying ad-hoc balancing approach); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110
S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (formulating and applying the Predominant Use Test);
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989) (formulating and applying the Rogers
Test); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (Cal. 2001)
(formulating and applying the Transformative Use Test).
32 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
33 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
34 See infra Part II.
35 See infra Part III.
36 See infra Part IV.
37 John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available at,
http://www.guttenberg.prg/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.
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the First Amendment against those underpinning the right of publicity.
After discussing the interests underlying the tension between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, Part II B analyzes the Supreme Court
decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., which formally
recognized that free speech can be constitutionally subordinated to certain
intellectual property rights. In the wake of Zacchini, Part II C considers
earlier case law that reconciled the tension between the right of publicity
and the First Amendment from an ad-hoc perspective by weighing the
competing interests based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
A. Origins of the Right of Publicity
As a general rule, the right of publicity is an intellectual property
right created by state law that protects the commercial interest in an
individual’s cultivated identity.38 The right of publicity grants individuals
the exclusive right to control the commercial value of their name and
likeness, as well as to prevent others from exploiting that value without
their consent.39 The right of publicity also recognizes the investment that
individuals makes in developing a public image, and it prevents unjust
enrichment by others who exploit the resulting goodwill.40
The right of publicity evolved out of the common law right of
privacy, which arose from the famous law review article written by

38 Thomas J. McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1.3 (2d ed. 2012);
see Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the elements of California’s
common law right of publicity: “To sustain this action, [a plaintiff] must prove: (1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury.”).
39
For a discussion of what constitutes an individual’s “likeness,” see Elvis Presley
Enter. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“To violate a plaintiff’s right of
publicity, . . . [] the defendant must employ an aspect of persona in a manner that
symbolizes or identifies the plaintiff, such as the use of a name, nickname, voice, picture,
achievements, performing style, distinctive characteristics or other indicia closely
associated with a person.”); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 1.3.
40 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977); see Gignilliat v.
Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P., 385 S.C. 452, 461 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Goodwill
may be properly enough described to be the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an
establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it
receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental
circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.”).

182

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:175

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.41 By preventing the press
from disseminating truthful, but yet, intrusive and embarrassing
information, Warren and Brandeis argued that people should have a legal
right to their privacy. 42 Warren and Brandeis were also concerned about
famous people being able to control the commercial use of their
photographs.43 As such, people brought right of privacy actions because
they wanted to enjoy their right to be left alone; thus, preventing others
from invading their privacy, injuring their feelings, or assaulting their
peace of mind.44
During the middle of the twentieth century, courts began recognizing
a distinction between the personal right to be left alone and the commercial
right to control the use of one’s identity.45 Courts found that the
commercial nature of a person’s desire to control the use of their identity,
not the right to be left alone was at issue.46 As a result, the concept of a

41 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890), available at, http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-/faculty/debaron/582/
582%20readings/right%20to%20privacy.pdf.
42 Id. at 213–14.
43 Id. at 195–96 n.7.
44 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 1.7.
45 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(discussing two key distinctions between the right of publicity and the right of privacy:
“First, the State’s interests in providing a cause of action in each instance are different. The
interest protected in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light is clearly
that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. By contrast,
the State’s interest in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest
of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment . . . . Second, the two
torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to the
public. In [the right of privacy] cases[,] the only way to protect the interests involved is to
attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in right of publicity cases
the only question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer such as [the plaintiff]
usually has no objection to the widespread publication of his act as long as he gets the
commercial benefit of such publication.”); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 504 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1966) (explaining there was a “fundamental distinction between causes of action
involving injury to feelings, sensibilities or reputation . . . , and those involving an
appropriation of rights in the nature of property rights for commercial exploitation.”). But
see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 167–78 (1993) (contending that expanded judicial and
scholarly recognition protecting the right of publicity are not compelling).
46 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967))
(“[A]lthough the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure does not per se
constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of that same data (as well as the name) for the
purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial project
other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does.”).
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property right in the commercial value of a person’s identity was born.47
No court explicitly recognized a distinct right of publicity until the Second
Circuit’s landmark case in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.48 Haelan involved two rival chewing gum sellers that battled
to obtain the rights from professional baseball players to use their pictures
on chewing gum cards.49 In resolving this dispute, the Second Circuit held
that “in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . , a man has
a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . , [which is] called a
‘right of publicity.’”50 Even after Judge Frank’s decision in Haelan, courts
remained reluctant to afford legal protection to the “right of publicity.”51
Even those courts that afforded legal protection to the right of publicity,
they often preferred other traditional labels.52
William Prosser’s influential 1960 law review article addressed this
tension between Judge Frank’s recognition of the right of publicity and the
subsequent case law reluctance to adopt the label and/or concept by
dividing the invasion of privacy tort into four separate and discrete
categories: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and (4)
appropriation.53 Prosser specifically viewed the Haelan decision as
47 See McCarthy, supra note 38, §§ 1.7, 10.9 (quoting Hoffman, Limitations on the
Right of Publicity, 28 BULL COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 111, 112 (1980)) (“It is more accurate to
think of [the right of publicity] as a sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights,
and rights under unfair competition than to attempt, Proscrustean-like, to fit it precisely
into one of those categories.”).
48 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
49 Id. at 867.
50 See id. at 868 (discussing the scope of the “right of publicity,” Judge Frank stated:
“For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways.”).
51 See Strickler v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (dismissing
the right of publicity claims, Judge Westover stated, “[t]his Court does not feel it wishes to
blaze the trail to establish in California a cause of action based upon the right of
publicity.”).
52 See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) (“The
state of the law is still that of a haystack in a hurricane but certain words and phrases stick
out. We read of the right of privacy, of invasion of property rights, of breach of contract,
of equitable servitude, of unfair competition; and there are even suggestions of unjust
enrichment.”); see also Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., No. 8645, 1957 WL 7316, at
*1 (Pa. Com. Pl. June 19, 1957) (“While we do not feel it necessary to place a label upon
the property right which the court is protecting, if we must do so, we feel that ‘right of
publicity’ is as apt a label as any other that might be suggested . . . . This . . . is not a
separate cause of action, but rather is unfair competition under another label.”).
53 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). But see Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971
(1964) (arguing that the right of privacy protects “the individual’s independence, dignity
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invoking the right of publicity under the label “appropriation privacy,”54
which he recognized as a “proprietary” right “in the exclusive use of the
plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”55 In light of
Prosser’s article and the inconsistent development in the case law
recognizing the right of publicity,56 states begun codifying the right of
publicity, starting with California in 1972.57 Presently, more than half of
the states in the United States have recognized the right of publicity by
either statute or at common law.58
Accordingly, the evolution and development of the right of publicity
can no longer be ignored. Instead, the right of publicity is now widely
recognized as a commercial tort that prevents the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of people’s name, likeness, voice, and
biographical data without their consent or due compensation.59 This
property right, however, may conflict with people’s right to freely express
themselves under the First Amendment. When this scenario arises, courts
must balance the competing interests and determine whether the right of
publicity outweighs the First Amendment interest.60 This Comment next
considers the nature of the competing interests underlying the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.

and integrity; it defines man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.” In other
words, “privacy” should not be viewed as “four torts,” but as a unified concept protecting
a fundamental aspect of human rights: human dignity).
54 Prosser, supra note 53, at 406.
55 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) (adopting Prosser’s
four-part division of privacy rights: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt b (1995)
[hereinafter Restatement Unfair Competition] (discussing the privacy-based appropriation
tort as encompassing “both personal and commercial interests caused by an unauthorized
exploitation of the plaintiff’s identity.”).
56 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 n.6 (D.N.J. 1981) (citations
omitted) (“The right of a person, whether or not termed ‘right of publicity,’ to control the
commercial value and exploitation of his or her name and likeness has received wide
recognition by the courts.”).
57 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 6.8; see also Restatement of Unfair Competition, § 46
(listing California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin as those states
recognizing a statutory right of publicity).
58 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 6.8.
59
McCarthy, supra note, § 1.38.
60 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–79.
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B. The Supreme Court Recognizes the Competing Interests Underlying
the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
Before engaging with the different balancing tests addressing the
conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, it is
paramount to understand the relevant interests at stake. On the one hand,
the right of publicity is not a right of censorship, but rather a right to
prevent others from misappropriating the economic value generated by an
individual’s fame through merchandising his or her name, image, or
likeness.61 Justifications for the protecting the right of publicity fall into
two categories; (1) economic and (2) non-economic.62
The primary economic justification in protecting the right of
publicity is that it presents a monetary incentive for creativity and
achievement.63
In effect, the economic goals are thought to
“stimulate[]athletic and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient
allocation of resources, and protecting consumers.”64 Failing to protect
the economic value developed in a person’s identity against commercial
exploitation is contrary to the fundamental purpose of intellectual property
laws, which seek to incentivize people to expend the time, effort, and
resources necessary to develop talents that will ultimately benefit society
due to its potential literary, artistic, political, scientific, or entertainment
value.65 Because the right of publicity is closely analogous to other

61 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408 (“[W]hen an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist’s right of free expression is outweighed
by the right of publicity.”); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (D.N.J. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“Underlying this right is the theory that a celebrity has
the right to capitalize on his persona, and the unauthorized use of that persona for
commercial gain violates fundamental notions of fairness and deprives the celebrity of
some economic value in his persona. Because celebrity status often translates to economic
wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s persona harms the person both by diluting the value
of the name and depriving that individual of compensation.”), rev’d on other grounds, 717
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
62 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th
Cir. 1996); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 2.1–2.7.
63 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973.
64 Id.
65 See Zacchini, 33 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))
(“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science
and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(“Intellectual property . . . provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it
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intellectual property rights, including copyright and trademark law,
society has an interest in affording the right of publicity similar
protection.66 In addition, when a defendant misappropriates the likeness
of an individual, such conduct dilutes that individual’s marketable
identity, which has gained public recognition.67 Thus, courts protecting
one’s right of publicity will prevent the devaluation of the commercial
value in that person’s identity by preventing inefficient exploitation of a
scarce resource recognized by the economic value in one’s likeness.68
Furthermore, the right of publicity serves to protect various noneconomic rights, including “safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits
of celebrity labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional
harm.”69 Protecting the right of publicity affords people the opportunity
to protect their name, image, or likeness from misappropriation to the
extent the individual expended “considerable money, time and energy” to
develop his reputation in a particular field.70
Because the skills,
reputation, and virtues developed by these people often take years of labor

stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to the
fruits of their labors.”).
66 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 401(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Zacchini, 33 U.S. at 577) (“[Copyright and patent] laws perhaps regard
the reward to the owner [as] a secondary consideration, . . . , but they were intended
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights in order to afford greater encouragement to
the production of works of benefit to the public.”).
67 See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Without
the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one’s likeness, that likeness would be
exploited commercially until the marginal value of its use is zero.”); see also Richard A.
Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 3.3, at 57 (8th ed. 2011) (“It might seem that
creating a property right in such uses would not lead to any socially worthwhile investment
but would simply enrich already wealthy celebrities. However, whatever information value
a celebrity’s endorsement has to consumers will be lost if every advertiser can use the
celebrity’s name and picture . . . . The value of associating the celebrity’s name with a
particular product will be diminished if others are permitted to use the name in association
with their products.”); Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 46 cmt. c (“The
right to prohibit unauthorized commercial exploitation of one’s identity allows a person to
prevent harmful or excessive commercial use that may dilute the value of the identity.”).
68 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978).
69 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th
Cir. 1996).
70 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 399 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 834–35 (1979)) (Bird, C. J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property
that society deems to have some social utility. Often considerable money, time, and energy
are needed to develop one’s prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be
required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety, or virtues are sufficiently developed to
permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promotion. For some, the
investment may eventually create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.”).
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to adequately develop and fine-tune,71 the right of publicity allows them
to control and enjoy the use of their identities for commercial gain.72 Thus,
the right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment when a defendant’s
primary purpose of using another’s identity is to appropriate the
commercial value of that person’s identity.73
On the other hand, when authors or creators use another individual’s
identity in a work, this use implicates that author’s or creator’s First
Amendment rights. There are several theories and policies supporting
First Amendment protections, which include fostering a marketplace of
ideas, encouraging human dignity and self-fulfillment, and promoting
democratic self-governance.74 Specifically, protecting free speech under
the First Amendment preserves an uninhibited marketplace of ideas that
advances knowledge and the search for the truth. Such advanced
knowledge is necessary to foster a democratic society.75 First Amendment
protection also encourages the fundamental respect for individual
development and self-realization.76 Because an individual’s right to self71

Id.
Id.
73 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (“The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity]
is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”); see
also Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 46 cmt. c (“With its emphasis on
commercial interests, the right of publicity [] secures for plaintiffs the commercial value of
their fame and prevents the unjust enrichment of others seeking to appropriate that value
for themselves.”). But see Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–74 (criticizing the incentive
justification “because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already
handsomely compensated[,]” and thus, “the commercial value of their identities is merely
a by-product of their performance values.”); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (downplaying the unjust
enrichment argument because “major league baseball players are rewarded, and
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large sums from
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”); Madow, supra note 45, at 209 (criticizing
the attempt to analogize the right of publicity’s incentive justification with other
intellectual property protections because “abolition of the right of publicity would leave
entirely unimpaired a celebrity’s ability to earn a living from the activities that have
generated his commercially marketable fame.”).
74 See Rodney A. Smolla, 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 2:3 (2011);
see also McCarthy, supra note 38, §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18.
75 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
by the Government itself or a private licensee.”).
76 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
Procunier v. Martinez 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (finding that the protection of free speech
advances the needs “of the human spirit – a spirit that demands self–expression,” adding
that “[s]uch expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of
identity.”).
72

188

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:175

expression respects the individual dignity that is inherent in a democratic
society, each speaker must be free of governmental restraint to express
oneself.77 While there are instances where competing interests may
challenge the fundamental protections underlying the First Amendment,78
safeguarding the integrity of the First Amendment weighs heavily in any
balancing inquiry.79 Because celebrities thrust themselves into the public
domain and invite public scrutiny, “the appropriation of [a celebrity’s
likeness] may have important uses in uninhibited debate on public
issues,”80 and “the creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an
important avenue of individual expression.”81 Thus, the right of publicity
has the potential for impairing one’s First Amendment right to freely
express oneself.82
The Supreme Court recognized these conflicting interests in Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Co., which is the Court’s only decision
addressing the tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment.83 To resolve the tension between these two competing
interests, the Court applied a balancing test to determine whether the
interests protected by the right of publicity outweighed the already-

77 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self–government.”).
78 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he First Amendment has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” including “obscenity,
incitement, and fighting words.”); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 757–61 (1985) (determining that a state may allow recovery of damages in
certain defamation cases after balancing “the State’s interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting
this type of expression”).
79 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from
being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
80 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 397 (Cal. 2001).
81 Id.
82 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3988,
at *11 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (explaining the real-world consequences
caused by the uncertainty created by the different balancing tests in resolving the tension
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity: “[W]ithout th[e] [Supreme]
Court’s guidance, artists, musicians, and other content creators will be unsure what
standards apply to their expression and, in particular, whether the realistic depiction of real
individuals is tortious. If the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work can strip
the work of First Amendment protection, then countless creative works are at risk of
suit . . . The effect of this uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the name of a
tort with questionable underlying purposes.”).
83 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75.
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existing First Amendment protections.84 In Zacchini, an Ohio television
news program recorded and subsequently broadcast Zacchini’s entire
“human cannonball” act from a local fair without his consent, which
Zacchini claimed violated his right of publicity as recognized by Ohio
law.85 Justice White, writing for the majority, held that the First
Amendment did not protect the television station against Zacchini’s state–
law right of publicity claim.86 After balancing the right of publicity against
the First Amendment, the Court determined that Zacchini’s economic
interest in his performance clearly outweighed the television’s First
Amendment defense because the television station misappropriated
Zacchini’s entire act.87 In support of its conclusion, the Court emphasized
that the purpose of protecting the right of publicity is to prevent unjust
enrichment by others who exploit the resulting goodwill at the public’s
expense.88
Thus, Zacchini stands for two key principles: (1) the right of
publicity is a state-law created intellectual property right that protects the
fruits of one’s labor 89 – that is, the ability for one to commercially exploit
his or her identity, name, or likeness – and (2) the state’s interest in
protecting the unauthorized use of this intellectual property right is not per
se outweighed by the interests underlying the First Amendment.90
Nonetheless, scholars have criticized Zacchini as not being an “ordinary”
right of publicity case because it involved the wholesale reproduction of a
live “entire act,” which is easily distinguishable from the unauthorized use
of a person’s identity.91 This is especially true when the unauthorized use
is in the form of an artistic depiction of an individual.92
84

Id.
Id. at 563–64.
86 Id. at 578–79.
87 Id. at 574–75.
88 See id. at 576 (“[T]he rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose
is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay.”).
89 Id.
90 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75 (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to
be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is]
quite sure that the First . . . Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”).
91 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:27 (recognizing that “while the Zacchini majority and
dissenting opinions have been picked apart word by word by the commentators, no clear
message emerges and no general rule is discernible by which to predict the result of
conflicts between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.”).
92
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3988,
at *11 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (“Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases
85
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Because Zacchini did not articulate a uniform balancing test for
weighing the competing interests underlying the right of publicity against
the interests underlying the First Amendment, the federal circuits were left
to develop several balancing formulations to resolve this conflict.93 Early
cases used an ad-hoc perspective, which balanced the relevant interests
based on the facts and surrounding circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
C. Post-Zacchini; Ad-Hoc Balancing Tests
Following Zacchini, but before courts began developing more
systematized legal balancing tests, a few federal circuits applied an ad-hoc
balancing approach to resolve cases where the right of publicity collided
with the First Amendment.94 Unlike trademark and copyright law, the
right of publicity does not have a federal statutory rule to accommodate
parody uses of a celebrity’s identity.95 Parody uses in the right of publicity
context, therefore, must find their safe harbor in the free speech principles
under the First Amendment.96
In White v. Elec. Am., Inc., the Ninth Circuit balanced Samsung
Electronics’s parodic use of Vanna White’s likeness in the commercial
speech context.97 In that case, Vanna White, the letter-turner on the
television game show “Wheel of Fortune,” sued Samsung for violating her
right of publicity because Samsung published an advertisement featuring
a costumed robot that parodied White’s persona.98 Judge Goodwin,
writing for the majority, reversed the grant of summary judgment for
Samsung, holding that White had produced sufficient evidence that
Samsung’s advertisement appropriated her identity in violation of her right
of publicity.99 Judge Kozinski, writing the dissenting opinion after a
involving mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to appropriation of their actual
performances in full.”).
93 See Marshall Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70
ALBANY L. REV. 1357, 1363 (2007) (“Most would acknowledge that the right of publicity
needs to be reigned in when it burdens free expression, but no one convenient legal format
has been found to set those limits.”).
94 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 959; C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2013) (describing the “fair use” doctrine under the Lanham
Act); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013) (describing the “fair use” doctrine under the Copyright Act).
For a discussion explaining the First Amendment value of parodies even though they may
conflict with intellectual property rights, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569,
579–81 (1994).
96 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.94.
97 White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
98
Id. at 1396.
99 Id. at 1398–99.
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suggestion for rehearing en banc failed,100 strongly argued that the
majority’s decision set forth a dangerous precedent by overprotecting the
right of publicity when balanced against the First Amendment.101
Contrary to White, the Tenth Circuit found the parodic use of
another’s identity or likeness was not commercial speech, but expressive
speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.102 In Cardtoons, L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., the Tenth Circuit weighed the
First Amendment rights of a company that produced trading cards
caricaturing and parodying well-known major league baseball players
against a claim brought under the Oklahoma right of publicity statute.103
Specifically, the plaintiff contracted with a political cartoonist, a sports
artist, and a sports author and journalist to design a set of trading cards that
featured readily identifiable caricatures of major league baseball players
with a humorous commentary about their careers on the back.104 Finding
the First Amendment outweighed the players’ right of publicity claims, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that sports and entertainment celebrities, through
their pervasive presence in the media, symbolized certain ideas and values
in our society, which encompassed a valuable means of expression in our
culture.105 Under these circumstances, the Cardtoons court found that the
card company’s parodic use of the players’ identities would not
substantially affect their economic interests.106 As a result, the court
concluded that the cards parodying and caricaturing celebrities were
protected under the First Amendment.107

100 White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
101 See id at 1513, 1516 (arguing that the majority erred because “[o]verprotecting
intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a
rich public domain . . . . Intellectual property rights aren’t free: They’re imposed at the
expense of future creators and of the public at large . . . . This is why intellectual property
law is full of careful balances between what’s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the
public domain for the rest of us[.]”).
102 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th
Cir. 1996) (distinguishing White because “the speech involved is not commercial, but
rather speech subject to full First Amendment protection.”). For a discussion examining
the scope of commercial speech, see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017
(3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (“[T]hree factors to consider in deciding whether speech
is commercial: (1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific
product or service; and (3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech.”).
103 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970–76.
104 Id. at 962.
105 Id. at 972.
106 See id. at 973–74 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–
91 1994)) (“Parody . . . rarely acts as a market substitute for the original”).
107 Id. at 973–76.
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Furthermore, courts have found that interests underlying the First
Amendment may outweigh interests underlying the right of publicity when
the disputed expression is a matter of “public interest.”108 In the fantasy
sports context, the Eighth Circuit balanced the right of publicity of major
league baseball players against the First Amendment rights to use the
players’ identities in a pay-to-play Internet fantasy baseball game.109 The
plaintiff, a provider of fantasy baseball games, sought a declaratory
judgment to establish its right to use, without a license, the baseball
players’s names and statistics in connection with its fantasy baseball
products.110 The issue before the court in C.B.C. Distribution and
Marketing, Inc. v. Major Legal Baseball Advance Media, L.P., was
whether the owner of a fantasy baseball product had the right to use
publicly available information without a license from the players.111 In
holding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment right trumped the players’
right of publicity, Judge Arnold, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
“recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic
performance of [players on Major League Baseball’s website]
command[ed] a substantial public interest.”112 The Eighth Circuit also
108

See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), (holding First
Amendment outweighed the right of publicity, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “the
information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available in the public
domain, and it would be strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right
to use information that is available to everyone.”); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432,
440–41 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that because “[the plaintiff] became a public figure through
his activities[,]” and because “[t]he subject matter of his statements – narcotics officers
using drugs, perjuring themselves, and making fraudulent charges – was a matter of public
interest[,]” the defendant could use these activities); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal.
App. 4th 536, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the surfing documentary was afforded
protection under the First Amendment); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal.
App. 4th 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that “[p]osters portraying the 49’ers’ victories
are . . . a form of public interest presentation to which protection must be extended.”);
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 411 (Cal Ct. App. 2001)
(finding “[t]he recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic performance
of these plaintiffs command a substantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of
expression due substantial constitutional protection.”). But see Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1283 n.12
(9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing C.B.C. because EA Sports not only uses publicly available
information, but it also “uses virtual likenesses of actual college football players.”); Hart
v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 n.37 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding “[t]he presence of a
digital avatar that recreates [the celebrity] in a digital medium differentiates this matter
from C.B.C.”).
109 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 820.
110 Id. at 820–21.
111 Id. at 823.
112
Id. at 823–24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400,
411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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noted that the major league baseball players’ economic interests were not
implicated because “players are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their
participation in games and can earn additional large sums from
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”113 Thus, the C.B.C.
majority found the plaintiff enjoyed a First Amendment right to use the
players’ names and playing records.114
While these cases approached the tension between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment based on the surrounding facts and
circumstances of each case, other courts have attacked this issue through
more methodological frameworks. Part III examines these more
standardized balancing tests and seeks to determine whether any of them
provide a more compelling legal framework in weighing the competing
interests in the context of video games.
III. THE MODERN BALANCING TESTS; FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS APPLYING SYSTEMATIC ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Zacchini set the stage for the development of more systematic
balancing tests when determining whether the interest in safeguarding the
right of publicity outweighs the interest in safeguarding the right to free
expression.115 Specifically, there are three balancing tests that courts have
applied in weighing the tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment: (1) the Predominant Use Test; (2) the Rogers Test; and (3)
the Transformative Use Test. Although most courts have declined to adopt
the Predominant Use Test, commentators have weighed in on the test’s
usefulness and its appropriate application.116 Rather, most courts have
113 Id. at 824. But see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013)
((“We reject as inapplicable in this case the suggestion that those who play organized sports
are not significantly damaged by appropriation of their likeness because ‘players are
rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional
large sums from endorsement and sponsorship arrangements . . . ’ If anything, the policy
considerations in this case weigh in favor of [the college football players]. As we have
already noted, intercollegiate athletes are forbidden from capitalizing on their fame while
in school. Moreover, the NCAA most recently estimated that ‘[l]ess than one in 100, or 1.6
percent, of NCAA senior football players will get drafted by a National Football League
(NFL) team.’”)(citations omitted)).
114 Id. at 824.
115 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 152–53 (“In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of publicity claim collided with First
Amendment protections.”).
116 See, e.g., William Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of
Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2012); Andrew BeckermanRodau, Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence of the Right
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adopted either the trademark-based Rogers Test or the copyright-based
Transformative Use Test in resolving the conflict between the competing
interests. While Part III A examines the application of the Predominant
Use Test, Part III B analyzes the development and application of the
Rogers Test. Part III C and C (i) discusses the Transformative Use Test
and its application in the video game context. Finally, Part III C (ii)
analyzes the Transformative Use Test’s most recent application in suits
brought by former college football players against EA Sports’s NCAA
Football video game series. After analyzing the different methodologies
in balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment, this Comment
contends that the Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing
framework that should be applied in the context of video games.
A. Predominant Use Test
The application of the Predominant Use Test has appeared only in
Doe v. TCI Cablevision,117 where the Missouri Supreme Court considered
a former professional hockey player’s right of publicity claim against a
comic book publishing company. Specifically, Anthony “Tony” Twist
sued a number of individuals and entities involved in producing and
publishing the Spawn comic book series after the introduction of a
villainous character named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.118 The
comic book creators asserted a First Amendment defense, arguing that the
use of Twist’s identity in their comic books constituted expressive speech
protected under the First Amendment.119 In balancing Twist’s property
interests in his own name and identity against the First Amendment
interests of the comic book creators, the TCI court rejected both the
Transformative Use and Rogers tests, finding that the tests gave “too little
consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity
have both expressive and commercial components.”120 Furthermore,
Judge Linbaugh, writing for a unanimous court, found that both tests were
too rigid, emphasizing that they operated “to preclude a cause of action
whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way expressive,

of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 132 (2012); Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s In the Game: Redefining the
Transformative Use Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215
(2012).
117 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
118 Id. at 365.
119
Id. at 367.
120 Id. at 374.
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regardless of its commercial exploitation.”121 Instead, the TCI court
applied a two-prong test, which it called “a sort of predominant use test”:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should
be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the
First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it
that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the
other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an
expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values
could be given greater weight.122

After applying the Predominant Use Test, the court ruled for Twist,
holding that the commercial value of using Twist’s identity trumped the
literary value expressed in the comic book.123 The Missouri Supreme
Court found that the comic book creators used Twist’s name and identity
“to attract attention to their product;” thus, attempting to obtain a
commercial advantage for their comic book and related merchandise
among hockey fans.124
Because applying the Predominant Use Test in balancing the relevant
interests underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment may
chill expressive speech,125 the Missouri Supreme Court is the only court to
adopt this balancing test.126
B. The Rogers Test
Various courts and commentators have contended that claims
asserting the right of publicity are akin to trademark claims under the
Lanham Act because both claims require courts to balance the interest in
protecting the relevant intellectual property rights against the interest in
121

Id.
Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right
of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)).
123 Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
124 Id. at 372; see id. at 374 (concluding “the use and identity of Twist’s name has
become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than an
artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances, free speech must give way to
the right of publicity.”).
125 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]s a necessary
(and insidious) consequence, [Hart’s] approach would suppose that there exists a broad
range of seemingly expressive speech that has no First Amendment value.”).
126 See Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It – You’ve Got To Have Hart: Simulation
Video Games May Redefine The Balance Between And Among The Right of Publicity, The
First Amendment, and Copyright Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (“[S]ome
courts have tried the transformative test, some the Rogers test, and one the ‘predominant
use’ test.”).
122
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free expression.127 Courts have determined that the application of the
Rogers Test makes sense “in the context of commercial speech when the
appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness creates a false and misleading
impression that the celebrity is endorsing a product.”128 The test arose in
the Second Circuit decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi,129 where Ginger Rogers
sued the producers and distributors of the film entitled, “Ginger and Fred,”
alleging that the title infringed Rogers’s right of publicity and confused
consumers in violation of the Lanham Act.130 In analyzing the right of
publicity claim under Oregon law,131 the Second Circuit articulated the
Rogers Test by holding that a celebrity’s name may be used in a movie
title unless the title was (1) “wholly unrelated” to the movie or (2) the title
was “simply a disguised commercial advertisement for sale of goods or
services.”132 After applying the Rogers two-prong test, the Second Circuit
denied Rogers’s right of publicity claim because the title was related to the
content of the movie and was not a disguised advertisement for a
commercial product.133
Other federal circuits have expanded the application of the Rogers
Test in the context of other expressive works under the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.134 Under the Restatement approach, the
127 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI Corp. Law &
Prac. Handbook 159, 170 (2000)) (noting that “a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is
the federal equivalent of the right of publicity”).
128 ETW, 332 F.3d at 956 (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (Cal. 2001)).
129 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
130 Id. at 997.
131 See id. at 1002 (noting that because “right of publicity claims are governed by the
substantive law of the plaintiff’s domicile[,]” and because “Rogers is an Oregon
domiciliary,” the Second Circuit found “Oregon law governs [her] [right of publicity]
claim.”).
132 Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 790 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th
Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013 (“This ‘wholly unrelated’
and ‘disguised commercial advertisement’ language is strikingly similar to the Lanham Act
relatedness test, but comes from a distinct body of law. Ultimately, it is not clear from [the
Court’s] reading of [the] Rogers’ language whether it disposed of the right of publicity
claim on state law, as opposed to federal constitutional grounds, but other courts have read
Rogers as resting on federal constitutional grounds.”).
133 Id. at 1004–05. But see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir.
2008) (Ambro., J.) (discussing the scope of the Rogers Test, the Third Circuit, in dicta,
expressed doubt over whether the Rogers Test could apply beyond the title of a work by
emphasizing that only a few other courts had done so).
134 See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthews v.
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Rogers Test is not
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use of a person’s identity does not violate their right of publicity when the
purpose of such use involves communicating information or expressing
ideas, such as in news, entertainment, or creative works.135 By contrast,
the Restatement notes that the right of publicity trumps a First Amendment
defense if the unauthorized use of the person’s identity was “solely to
attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified [person].”136
The Fifth Circuit applied this broader application of the Rogers Test
in Matthews v. Wozencraft,137 which considered whether a fictional novel
incorporating events from the life of an undercover narcotics officer
violated the officer’s right of publicity.138 In articulating the legal standard
for the right of publicity claim, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was irrelevant
“whether [the book] [was] viewed as a[] historical or [] fictional work, so
long as it [was] not simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the
sale of goods or services.”139 Because the court found that the book was
not a commercial advertisement, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff
had to show that the defendant acted with actual malice, which
encompassed a “reckless disregard for the truth” to establish his right of
publicity claim.140 When applying this actual malice standard, the
Matthews court ruled for the defendant because the plaintiff voluntarily
interviewed with the media and the subject matter of his statements were
a matter of public interest.141
The Sixth Circuit also applied the Restatement’s extension of the
Rogers Test in Parks v. LaFace Records,142 where it considered whether a
rap song entitled “Rosa Parks” infringed the famous Civil Rights icon’s

limited to literary titles but is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of
artistic expression.”); accord ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n.11 (6th
Cir. 2003) (The Rogers Test is “generally applicable to all cases involving literary or
artistic works where the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use of a
celebrity’s identity is protected by the First Amendment.”).
135 Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 47; see id. § 47 cmt. c (“Use of
another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . not ordinarily an infringement
[of the right of publicity] . . . ”).
136 Id. § 47 cmt. c.
137 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
138 Matthews, 15 F.3d at 439–40.
139 Id. at 440 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id. Contra Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 156 & 156 n.20 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis in applying the actual malice standard because “[i]n Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co . . . . , as standing for the proposition that the actual malice standard does
not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of publicity.”).
141
Mathews, 15 F.3d at 440–41.
142 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
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right of publicity.143 Applying the expanded Rogers test, Judge Holschuh,
writing for a unanimous court, concluded that there was an issue of
material fact as to whether the title of the song was “wholly unrelated” to
the lyrics because a reasonable finder of fact “could find the title to be a
disguised commercial advertisement or adopted solely to attract attention
to the work.144
Although some federal circuits have applied the Rogers Test in
balancing the tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment,145 most federal circuits have relied on the Transformative
Use Test.
C. The Transformative Use Test
The California Supreme Court constructed the Transformative Use
Test after finding that elements of the copyright “fair use” doctrine most
appropriately balanced the competing interests underlying the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.146 Generally, works containing
“significant transformative elements” are less likely to interfere with the
143

Id. at 441–42.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But see, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d
141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding “Parks to be less than persuasive given that just over a
month later another panel of the Sixth Circuit decided ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,
a right of publicity case where the [Sixth] Circuit applied the Transformative Use Test.”)
(citation omitted); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the Sixth Circuit in Parks is
“only circuit court to import the Rogers test into the publicity arena, . . . [and] has done so
inconsistently.”).
145 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F. 3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the
Rogers Test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment outweighed any risk
of confusion between Mattel and the song title)Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday
Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
146 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404–05 (Cal.
2001); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990))
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]hether the new work merely
supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, [], or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
transformative.”). While the California Supreme Court rejected wholesale importation of
the entire Copyright “fair use” defense, it did make key use of the transformative part of
the fair use analysis, see Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00-3802, 2001 WL
1111970, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Although post-Campbell, courts have been neither
consistent nor expositive in the interpretation and application of ‘transformative,’ it is now
established that uses which merely copy, repackage, republish, substitute for, encapsulate
or appropriate the essence of the copyrighted material are not transformative; whereas uses
which ‘employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the
original’ are transformative.”).
144
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economic interests implicated by the right of publicity.147 The Ninth
Circuit has noted that two California Supreme Court decisions “bookend
the spectrum” of the Transformative Use Test.148
At one end of the spectrum, the California Supreme Court discussed
a clear example of a non-transformative use in Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc.149 Comedy III addressed whether the First Amendment
protected an artist’s production and sale of t-shirts and prints bearing a
charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges.150 Judge Mosk, writing for a
unanimous court, found that the first “fair use” factor from copyright law,
“the purpose and character of the use,” properly balanced the competing
interests between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.151
While articulating the Transformative Use Test, Judge Mosk held
that the balance between the right of publicity and First Amendment
interests turns on the following five factors, which includes whether:
(1) the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an
original work is synthesized or the depiction or imitation of the celebrity
is the very sum and substance of the work in question; (2) the work is
primarily the defendant’s own expression, if the expression is something
other than the likeness of the celebrity; (3) the literal and imitative or
creative elements predominate in the work; (4) the marketability and
economic value of the challenged work derives primarily from the fame
of the celebrity depicted; and (5) an artist’s skill and talent has been
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional
portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit the celebrity’s fame.152
The California Supreme Court carefully noted, however, that
transformative or creative elements were not confined to parodic uses,153
but may also include factual reporting and fictionalized portrayal, all
ranging from heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social

147 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996)) (explaining “works of parody or other
distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good
substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally
threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to
protect.”).
148 See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
149 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 393.
150 Id. at 393.
151 Id. at 404–05.
152 See id. at 406–08; see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:72 (discussing the fivefactor Transformative Use Test).
153 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406.
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criticism.154 Thus, a defendant may assert a First Amendment affirmative
defense under the Transformative Use Test so long as the artistic visual
depiction of the celebrity contains “significant transformative elements”
or the economic value of the challenged work does not primarily derive
from the fame of the celebrity depicted.155 Applying the Transformative
Use Test, Judge Mosk ruled that the artist’s charcoal portraits violated the
Three Stooges’s right of publicity.156 The Court found that the defendant’s
creative contribution was subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
literal image of the Three Stooges to commercially exploit their fame.157
A few years later, the California Supreme Court revisited the
Transformative Use Test in Winter v. DC Comics,158 which illustrated a
use that was highly transformative. Two musicians, Johnny and Edgar
Winter, who both possessed long white hair and albino features, brought
suit against DC Comics over images of two villainous half-man, halfworm creatures, both with long white hair and albino features, named
Johnny and Edgar Autumn.159 Applying the Transformative Use Test,
Judge Chin, writing for a unanimous court, held that the Winter brothers’
claim were barred by the First Amendment as a matter of law.160 In finding
that the comic depictions at issue “depict[ed] fanciful, creative
characters,”161 the California Supreme Court reasoned that the First
Amendment protected these depictions because the characters were
“distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody, or caricature.”162 Thus, the
Winter court found that DC Comics’ work would not greatly threaten the
commercial value of the Winter brothers’ likenesses because their fans
“would find the drawings of the Autumn brothers [in the accused’s comic
book] unsatisfactory as a substitute for conventional depictions.”163
154

See id. at 407 (citations omitted) (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate
in the work.”).
155 Id.
156
Id. at 408–09.
157 Id. at 409.
158 30 Cal. 4th 881 (Cal. 2003).
159 Id. at 886.
160 Id. at 890–92.
161 Id. at 892.
162 Id. at 891; see also Ross v. Roberts, 282 Cal. App. 4th 677, 687-88 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013) (holding that while “[the defendant] made music out of fictional tales of dealing
drugs and other exploits – some of which related to [the] plaintiff[,] . . . [the defendant]
created original artistic works” protected under the First Amendment).
163 Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 890–91; see id. at 891 (citations omitted) (internal citation
omitted) ((“The question is whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed. If
the work is sufficiently transformative to receive legal protection, it is of no moment that
the advertisements may have increased the profitability of the [work]. If the challenged
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Although Comedy III and Winter bookend the spectrum of cases
applying the Transformative Use Test, most cases fall somewhere in the
middle of the Transformative Use Test jurisprudence because they not
only focus on the use of peoples’ identities, but also add a transformative
element to the work.164 For instance, in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards,165 the
Ninth Circuit applied the Transformative Use Test to a Hallmark greeting
card that depicted Paris Hilton in a manner reminiscent of an episode of
Hilton’s reality show, The Simple Life, and quoted her famous statement,
“that’s hot.”166 While comparing Hallmark’s card to the video game in
Kirby v. Sega America, Inc,167 the Ninth Circuit found the greeting card
did not contain the degree of “significant transformative elements” added
to the video game because the game transported a 1990s singer into the
25th century and transformed her into an entirely new character as spaceage news reporter.168 Accordingly, the Hilton court ruled that Hallmark’s
greeting card depicting Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon waitress
accompanied by the line “that’s hot” was not transformative and thus,
infringed Hilton’s right of publicity.169
One month after the Parks decision,170 the Sixth Circuit revisited the
tension between the right of publicity and the right to free speech in ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc.,171 which focused on a photograph of Tiger
Woods set among a collage of other, golf-related photographs.172
Although ETW mentioned both Parks and its application of the Rogers
Test under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,173 the Sixth
Circuit did not apply the Rogers Test to the Ohio right of publicity claim
at issue. Instead, the balancing test the Sixth Circuit ultimately applied
was a combination of an ad-hoc approach and the Transformative Use

work is transformative, the way it is advertised cannot somehow make it nontransformative.”) (citations omitted)).
164 See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2009); ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
165 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2009).
166 Id. at 899.
167 See Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see
also infra notes 197–202.
168 Hilton, 599 F.3d at 899.
169 See id. at 911 (“While a work need not be phantasmagoric as in Winter or fanciful
as in Kirby in order to be transformative, there is enough doubt as to whether Hallmark’s
card is transformative under our case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the
defense . . . ”).
170 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
171 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
172
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003).
173 Id. at 936 n.17.
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Test.174 In analogizing the collage of Tiger Woods prints with the Three
Stooges portraits from Comedy III, Judge Graham, writing for the
majority, held that the collage was sufficiently transformative because it
“d[id] not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods.”175 The
majority afforded First Amendment protection based on the creative
elements found in the “panorama” of Woods’s historic 1997 victory at the
world-famous Masters Tournament.176 The “panorama” conveyed a
message about the significance of Woods’s achievement through images
suggesting that Woods would eventually join the ranks of the world’s best
golfers.177 Thus, the defendant transformed Woods’s identity by adding
significant creative elements that made it “less likely to interfere with the
economic interest protected by [his] right of publicity.”178
Judge Clay, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the ETW majority for
its disjointed analysis in balancing Woods’s economic interest in his
identity against the defendant’s First Amendment interest in the
painting.179 Although Judge Clay agreed that the Transformative Use Test
was appropriate in this case, he disagreed with the majority’s
application.180 Applying the Transformative Use Test, the dissent found
the defendant’s work did not contain significant transformative
elements.181 Favoring Tiger Woods, Judge Clay found that the disputed
images “gain[ed] their commercial value by exploiting the fame and
celebrity status that Woods ha[d] worked to achieve.”182
In sum, the Transformative Use Test jurisprudence includes a
spectrum of works that transform the subject work at issue – turning on
whether and how the celebrity’s identity is transformed.183 At one end of
the spectrum, the California Supreme Court found in Comedy III that the
drawings of the Three Stooges were mere literal depictions of celebrities
recreated in a different medium of expression.184 At the other end of the
174

See id. at 937–38 (illustrating the ETW majority’s two part analysis applying a
balancing test from comment d in the Restatement analyzing “the substantiality and market
effect of the use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the informational and creative
content[,]” as well as the Transformative Use Test).
175 Id. at 938.
176 Id. at 936.
177 ETW, 332 F.3d at 938.
178 Id.; see also Moore v. Weinstein Co., LLC, 545 Fed. App’x. 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2013)
(analogizing ETW, the Sixth Circuit held “the [m]ovie added significant expressive
elements to any purported use of [the Plaintiff’s] identity.”).
179 ETW, 332 F.3d at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 951–52.
181 Id. at 959–60.
182 Id. at 960.
183
McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:72.
184 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 409 (Cal. 2001).
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spectrum, the Winter court found significant creative elements when the
publisher the created fanciful characters in a fanciful setting in his comic
book that drew inspiration from celebrities.185 Most cases, however, fall
somewhere in between the two California Supreme Court decisions, such
as Hilton and ETW. Part III C (i) examines some of these other middleground cases applying the Transformative Use Test in the context of video
games.
i. The Transformative Use Test and Video Games
Video games are expressive works entitled to as much First
Amendment protection as the most profound literature and
entertainment.186 The California Court of Appeal decided two cases
applying the Transformative Use Test to video games. 187 They are
particularly instructive regarding the Third and Ninth Circuit’s
dispositions in resolving the former college football players’ claims
against EA Sports’ First Amendment defenses. In Kirby v. Sega of
America, Inc.,188 the court applied the Transformative Use Test in a case
involving the musician, Kierin Kirby, who claimed that Sega of America,
Inc.’s (“Sega”) video game misappropriated her likeness and signature
phrases for purposes of creating the character of Ulala.189 In applying the
Transformative Use Test, the court noted that, on the one hand, not only
did Kirby’s signature phrases included “ooh la la,”190 but that both she and
Ulala would often use phrases like “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I
won’t give up.”191 On the other hand, the court noted that differences did
exist between the two characters, such as Ulala’s physique, primary
hairstyle, costumes, and dance moves.192 After comparing and contrasting
the two characters, the Kirby court ruled in Sega’s favor, rejecting Kirby’s
argument that the differences between her and Ulala added no additional

185

Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 891 (Cal. 2003).
See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“Like the
protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas –
and even social messages – through many familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment
protection.”).
187 See e.g., Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006);
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
188 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (Bolan, J).
189 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 52–53.
190 Id. at 56.
191
Id.
192 Id.
186
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meaning or message to the work because it was clear that that Ulala was
not a mere digital recreation of Kirby.193
Five years later, the California Court of Appeal in No Doubt v.
Activision Publishing, Inc., again addressed a right of publicity claim in
the context of video games.194 No Doubt revolved around the video game
“Band Hero,” which allowed players to simulate performing in a rock
band.195 By choosing from a number of playable characters, known as
“avatars,” players could be a guitarist, a singer, or a drummer.196 Some of
the avatars were digital recreations of real-life musicians, including
members of the band No Doubt.197 After a contract dispute broke off
relations between the band and the company, No Doubt sued, claiming
Activision violated their right of publicity.198
Applying the Transformative Use Test, the California Court of
Appeal held Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likeness was not sufficiently
transformative because the avatars were precisely computer-generated
reproductions of the band members that did not meld with the other
elements of the game to become Activision’s own artistic expression.199
Distinguishing Kirby and Winter, Judge Willhite, writing for the majority,
noted that unlike the “fanciful creative characters” in the earlier cases, the
No Doubt avatars could not be altered by players, and thus, remained “at
all times immutable images of the real celebrity musicians.”200 This fact
by itself, however, did not end the court’s application of the
Transformative Use Test because “even literal reproductions of celebrities
can be ‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the context into
which the celebrity image is placed.”201 While finding no additional
transformative elements, the court emphasized that the No Doubt
characters were performing the same activity, rock songs, in which the
band attained and maintained its fame.202 Even though the surrounding
elements in the video game contained creative elements, Judge Willhite
found that these creative elements failed to “transform the avatars into
193

Id. at 59–60.
122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
195 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 402.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 411–12.
200 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410.
201 See id. (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 409) (noting, for example, the Andy Warhol
silkscreens featuring celebrity portraits of Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis
Presley, through “careful manipulation of context,” convey an ironic message about the
“dehumanization of celebrity” through reproductions of celebrity images).
202 Id. at 410–11.
194

2014]

A Collision Course

205

anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing
exactly what they do as celebrities.”203
In the wake of these two California Court of Appeal decisions, the
Third and Ninth Circuit considered essentially two identical video game
cases addressing whether the right of publicity of a former college football
player outweighed the First Amendment right of a video game developer
to use his likeness in its games.204
ii. The Transformative Use Test; EA Sports’s NCAA Football
Video Game Series
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,205 presented a case of first impression for the
Third Circuit. Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers quarterback, filed suit against
EA Sports alleging a violation of his right of publicity under the common
law of New Jersey.206 Specifically, the crux of Hart’s argument was that
EA Sports allegedly misappropriated his identity, such as his likeness and
biographical information, for commercial use in its NCAA Football video
game series without his consent.207 After analyzing the Predominant Use
Test, the Rogers Test, and the Transformative Use Test, the Third Circuit
determined that the Transformative Use Test struck the proper balance in
reconciling the tension underlying the interests protected by the right of
publicity and afforded by the First Amendment in the video game
context.208
In formulating the proper application of the Transformative Use Test,
Judge Greenaway, writing for the majority, undertook a step-by-step
203

See id. at 411(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “the
graphics and other background content of the game are secondary, and the expressive
elements of the game remain manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
conventional portrait of [No Doubt] so as to commercially exploit [its] fame.”); see also
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Ninth Circuit considered
a Hallmark card featuring Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon waitress’s body was not a
“transformative use” because the “basic setting” was the same as an episode of Hilton’s
television show in which she was depicted as “born to privilege, working as a waitress”).
204 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 149–52 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec.
Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
205 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 151–52 (“Since neither the New Jersey courts nor our own
circuit have set out a definitive methodology for balancing the tension between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity, we are presented with a case of first impression.”).
206 Id. at 145.
207 Id. at 147 & n.8 (“[Hart] alleges that the physical attributes exhibited by the virtual
avatar in NCAA Football are his own (i.e., he attended high school in Florida, measures
6’2” tall, weighs 197 pounds, wears number 13, and has the same left wrist band and helmet
visor) and that the avatar’s speed, agility, and passer rating reflected actual footage of
[Hart] during his tenure at Rutgers.”).
208 Id. at 165.
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analysis in determining whether Hart’s identity was sufficiently
transformed in EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series:
(1) Whether [Hart]’s ‘identity’ [was] sufficiently transformed in
NCAA Football; (2) how [Hart’s] identity [was] incorporated into
and transformed by NCAA Football; (3) whether the type and
extent of interactivity permitted is sufficient to transform [Hart’s]
likeness into [EA Sports’s] own expression.209

Applying this three-step formulation of the Transformative Use Test,
the Third Circuit ruled in favor of Hart’s right of publicity claim, holding
that EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series did not sufficiently
transform Hart’s identity.210 To the extent users were able to alter Hart’s
and other college football players’s avatar appearances, Judge Greenaway
found that this interactive feature alone could not satisfy the
Transformative Use Test.211 Moreover, the Hart majority noted that the
other creative elements featured in NCAA Football, including the feature
that allowed users to alter the avatar’s appearance, were deemed “wholly
unrelated elements” under the Transformative Use Test because they did
not affect how Hart’s identity was used or altered when playing the
game.212 Judge Greenaway reasoned that because the players’ unaltered
likenesses were an essential element to the user’s game experience, the
Third Circuit was disinclined to credit such a game feature as a
transformative use.
Although agreeing with the Hart majority that the Transformative
Use Test provided the proper balancing test for resolving the conflict
between the right of publicity and First Amendment, Judge Ambro, in
dissent, disagreed with the majority’s formulation and application of the
test.213 First, Judge Ambro contended that the majority erroneously
formulated the Transformative Use Test because it narrowly focused on
209 Id. at 165–67 (noting the term “identity” in the video game context includes the
combination of Hart’s likeness and biographical information).
210 Id. at 169.
211 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (“If the mere presence of the feature were enough, video
game companies could commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to absolve
themselves by including a feature that allows users to modify the digital likenesses.”); see
also id. at 168–69 (finding “[i]n the first instance, the relationship between these assets and
the digital avatar is predicated on the users’ desire to alter the avatar’s appearance,
which . . . is insufficient to satisfy the Test.”).
212 Id. at 169 (“Decisions applying the Transformative Use Test invariably look to how
the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other aspects of a work . . . . [T]his inquiry
was aimed at determining whether this context acted upon the celebrity identity in a way
that transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity beyond providing a ‘merely
trivial variation.’”).
213 Id. at 170–71 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
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“Hart’s identity alone, disregarding other features of the work.”214 Rather,
Judge Ambro argued that the proper focus of the test examines “the
context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on the
individual’s likeness.”215 Second, the dissent argued that the majority
misapplied the Transformative Use Test, finding EA Sports’s First
Amendment right outweighed Hart’s right of publicity claim.216
Specifically, Judge Ambro found that NCAA Football, in its totality,
contained significant creative elements based on its “original graphics,
videos, sound effects, and game scenarios[,]” which allowed users to direct
how they want to play the game.217 Furthermore, Judge Ambro
emphasized that even if users select not to alter the characteristics of the
players’ avatars, the combination of the other creative elements are still
sufficiently transformative.218 Accordingly, the dissent found that the
video game contained “significant transformative elements” as a whole,
thereby concluding that EA Sports’s First Amendment defense trumped
Hart’s right of publicity claim.219
Similarly, in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., the issue before the Ninth
Circuit was whether, for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion under Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1), EA Sports’s First Amendment defense
outweighed Samuel Keller’s right of publicity claim.220 Keller, as part of
a putative class-action complaint filed in the Northern District of
California, asserted that EA Sports violated his right of publicity under
California Civil Code § 3344 and California common law by using his
likeness in its NCAA Football video game series.221 Applying the
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Id. at 171–73 (explaining “a narrow focus on an individual’s likeness, rather than
how that likeness is incorporated into and transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed
formulation of the transformative inquiry. The whole . . . is the better baseline for that
inquiry.”).
215 Id at 171–72 (finding that the proper formulation of the Transformative Use Test
“examine[s] the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it satisfies the
Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment protection.”).
216 Id. at 175
217 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
218 Id.
219 Id. (“Any attempt to separate these elements from the use of Hart’s likeness
disregards NCAA Football’s many expressive features beyond an avatar having
characteristics similar to Hart. His likeness is transformed by the artistry necessary to create
a digitally rendered avatar within the imaginative and interactive world EA has placed that
avatar.”).
220 724 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (“California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against
public participation (SLAPP) statute is designed to discourage suits that masquerade as
ordinary lawsuits but are brought to deter common citizens from exercising their political
or legal rights or to punish them for doing so.”).
221 Id.
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Transformative Use Test, the Ninth Circuit held that EA Sports’s use of
Keller’s likeness in its video game did not sufficiently transform Keller’s
identity because “it literally recreate[d] Keller in the very setting in which
he has achieved renown.”222 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Bybee, on
behalf of the majority, agreed with Judge Greenaway’s analysis in Hart,223
discounting the user’s ability to alter the avatar’s appearance.224
Judge Thomas, who agreed with Judge Ambro’s dissenting opinion
in Hart,225 also disagreed with the majority’s formulation and application
of the Transformative Use Test.226 According to Judge Thomas, the proper
formulation examines “whether the transformative and creative elements
of a particular work predominate over commercially based literal or
imitative depictions.”227 The dissent asserted that such an inquiry involves
a two-step process, which first considers the creative work at issue, and
then balances these creative elements against the publicity right at stake.228
In applying this two-step test, Judge Thomas found that the creative
elements in EA Sports’s video games were sufficiently transformative,229
“both from a quantitative and qualitative perspective.”230 Thus, the dissent
concluded that the First Amendment protected EA Sports’s NCAA
Football video game series.231
222 Id. at 1271; see also Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911(9th Cir. 2009)
(applying anti-SLAPP statute to the transformative use test the court concluded “that the
card falls far short of the level of new expression . . . [,] [in which] there is enough doubt
as to whether Hallmark’s card is transformative under [Ninth Circuit] case law that [the
panel] cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the defense as a matter of law.”).
223 Id. at 1278–79 (“Like the majority in Hart, [the Ninth Circuit] rel[ies] substantially
on No Doubt, and believe[d] [it was] [] correct to do so.”).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 724 F.3d 1268, 1285 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (“[B]ecause excessive deconstruction of Comedy III can
lead to misapplication of the test[,] . . . it is at this juncture that I must respectfully part
ways with my colleagues in the majority.”).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1285–87.
229 Id. at 1286 (“The athletic likenesses are but one of the raw materials from which the
broader game is constructed[;] [t]he work, considered as a whole, is primarily one of EA’s
own expression[;] [t]he creative and transformative elements predominate over the
commercial use of likenesses[;] [t]he marketability and economic value of the game comes
from the creative elements within, not from the pure commercial exploitation of a celebrity
image[;] [and] [t]he game is not a conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work consisting
of many creative and transformative elements.”).
230 Id. at 1287–88 (“As a quantitative matter, NCAA Football is different from other
right of publicity cases in the sheer number of virtual actors involved” because “NCAA
Football includes not just Sam Keller, but thousands of virtual actors[,]” and thus, [t]he
sheer quantity of the virtual players in the game underscores the inappropriateness of
analyzing the right of publicity through the lens of one likeness only.”); see also id. at 1288
(“As a qualitative matter, the essence of NCAA Football is founded on publicly available
data, which is not protected by any individual publicity rights.”).
231 Id at 1286.
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In short, when balancing the interest that the right of publicity
protects against those interests that the First Amendment protects, the
Third and Ninth Circuits agreed that the methodology set forth by the
Transformative Use Test strikes the best balance. Panels within the Third
and Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed as to the proper formulation and
application of the Transformative Use Test in the video game context. Part
IV addresses these two concerns, as well as justifying why the
Transformative Use Test provides the best balancing framework when
weighing the interests between the right of publicity and First Amendment
in the video game context.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Comment contends that in the context of video games the most
effective analytical framework among varying mythologies for balancing
the right of publicity and the First Amendment is the Transformative Use
Test. Part IV A compares and contrasts the three different analytical
balancing tests, demonstrating that the Transformative Use Test is the
most refined test when applied to video games. Part IV B discusses why
the majority opinions’ in Hart and Keller properly applied the
Transformative Use Test, whereas adopting the dissenting opinions’
analyses would turn the right of publicity on its head. More specifically,
while Part IV B (i) examines the proper formulation of the Transformative
Use Test in the video game context, Part IV B (ii) analyzes the test’s
correct application.
A. The Transformative Use Test is the Proper Analytical Framework for
Balancing the Tension between the First Amendment and the Right of
Publicity
After analyzing the Predominant Use Test, the Rogers Test, and the
Transformative Use Test, Judge Greenaway correctly determined that the
Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing framework for resolving
the conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity when
applied to video games.232 First, with respect to the Predominant Use Test,
232 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013). But see, David Tan,
Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 25–26 (2011) (criticizing courts for adopting the Transformative Use
Test because it “can encourage judges to be art critics or base decisions on external factors
like the fame of the artist . . . . In addition, the cryptic judicial comments that literal
depictions like Andy Warhol’s silkscreens of celebrities may also be transformative if they
carry a particular social message lend little guidance to how a court may meaningfully
determine what constitutes the criteria for transformative use. As shown by recent
California decisions, the test is focused on visual transformation which can be
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the Third Circuit and commentators correctly noted that the application of
the test overprotects the right of publicity.233 Initially, the TCI court
conceded that the Predominant Use Test is particularly for “cases where
speech is both expressive and commercial.”234 As such, the Predominant
Use Test, rather than focusing on expression, examines the product sold
and whether it predominantly exploits the commercial value of the
celebrity’s identity.235
Although a consideration under the Transformative Use Test is
whether the “marketability and economic value of the challenged work
derive primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted,”236 the
overprotective of art and entertainment that contribute little to the discussion of public
issues, but underprotective of political speech which may be contextually transformative
(because of its recoding) though not visually transformative.”); E. Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916 (2003) (criticizing the
Transformative Use Test as uncertain and unpredictable); F.J. Dougherty, All the World’s
Not a Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to
a Right of Publicity Claim against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 Colum. J. L. & ARTS
1, 73 (2003) (“A better test that would be less vague and would be more effective in
protection valuable First Amendment [i]nterests would permit the sale of image copies –
that is, any artwork or photograph portraying an individual in the form of prints, posters,
lithographs or other mere reproductions – without regard to their artistic quality, while
prohibiting sale of unrelated image merchandise, such as T-shirts, buttons or cups, that
embody such a work. In other words, it would be better for judges to determine what is
unrelated merchandise than to determine whether a given image work is good enough to
qualify as speech.”); McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (commenting that the California
Supreme Court’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test “will unfortunately prove
extremely difficult to predict and apply because it requires a court to make an aesthetic
judgment about the challenged artistic use[,]” and thus, “th[e] transformative test is
subjective in application, unpredictable in outcome and fraught with ambiguity.”).
233 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 154; see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb
on the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1503, 1512 (2009) (discussing the “‘Transformative Use’ approach is certainly more
speech-protective than the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ‘predominant use’ test, in part
because California does not count a defendant’s intent to gain a marketing advantage from
the use against him if he contributes sufficient input of his own.”).
234
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
235 Id. at 374.
236 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 407; see also Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881,
889 (Cal. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“If it is determined
that a work is worthy of First Amendment protection because added creative elements
significantly transform the celebrity depiction, then independent inquiry into whether or
not that work is cutting into the market for the celebrity’s images . . . appears to be
irrelevant . . . . [E]ven if the work’s marketability and economic value derive primarily
from the fame of the celebrity depicted, the work may still be transformative and entitled
to First Amendment protection. However, if the marketability and economic value of the
challenged work do not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame, there would generally
be no actionable right of publicity. When the value of the work comes principally from
some source other than the fame of the celebrity – from the creativity, skill, and reputation
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California Supreme Court importantly emphasized that this is merely a
secondary consideration to be analyzed only in close cases.237 Because it
is undisputed that video games constitute expressive speech, and not
commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence,238 the only logical conclusion is that the Predominant Use
Test is unfit for a balancing test that requires calibrated balancing between
two fundamental and competing interests. In addition, the subjective
nature of the Predominant Use Test is problematic because it may put
courts in a dangerous and unfamiliar position of “call[ing] upon judges to
act as both impartial jurists and discerning art critics[,]” two roles that
cannot co-exist.239 Given the limited inquiry of the Predominant Use Test
focusing not on the creative elements of an artist’s expression, but rather
on the expressive value of the celebrity’s identity, it is likely that such
focus will result in suppressing valuable expressive speech.240 Thus,
applying the Predominant Use Test in the video game context does not
sufficiently weigh the underlying interests protected by the First
Amendment.
Unlike the Predominant Use Test, applying the Transformative Use
Test provides a more effective balancing approach because it “requires a
more circumscribed inquiry” that will require courts to recognize the
fundamental protections afforded to the First Amendment by “focusing on
the specific aspects of a work that speak to whether it was merely created
of the artist – it may be presumed that sufficient transformative elements are present to
warrant First Amendment protection.”).
237 Id.; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 n.29 (“The court in Comedy III rightly recognized
that the balancing inquiry suggested by the Supreme Court in Zacchini cannot start and
stop with commercial purpose or value.”).
238 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
239 Hart, 717 F.3d at 154 (“Adopting [the Predominant Use Test] would be tantamount
to admitting that it is proper for courts to analyze select elements of a work to determine
how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.”). But see Keller v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 3988, at *13 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (arguing the Third and Ninth
Circuit’s holdings that “the depiction of a person’s image or likeness in an expressive work
enjoys First Amendment protection against a right-of-publicity claim only if the depiction
sufficiently alters or “transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness” will result in “chill[ing]
expression, both because it is hard to predict what a court will decide is sufficiently
‘transformative,’ and because such an inquiry inevitably requires a court to make a
subjective judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus warranting protection, or
‘literal,’ and thus subject to liability.”); McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (explaining that
the “transformative’ test is subjective in application, unpredictable in outcome and fraught
with ambiguity.”).
240 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; see also id. at 154 (positing that a consequence of the
Predominant Use Test “would suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly
expressive speech that has no First Amendment value.”).
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to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”241 Furthermore, contrary to the
Predominant Use Test, which merely evaluates the expressive “value” of
a celebrity’s identity,242 Hart’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test
evaluated not only the expressive “value” of Hart’s likeness, but also the
use of Hart’s identity in the context of EA Sports’s NCAA Football video
game series.243 Accordingly, the failure of the Predominant Use Test to
examine how other creative elements in the work affect the celebrity’s
identity will likely chill expressive speech that United States Constitution
protects.
Second, with respect to the Rogers Test, the Third and Ninth Circuits,
as well as commentators have properly found the test unfit for carefully
calibrated balancing between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity because the trademark-based test overprotects the First
Amendment.244 As an initial matter, the Third Circuit appropriately agreed
with the Second Circuit in Rogers that the right of publicity is broader than
trademark protection.245 The Rogers test was intended to be used in
trademark-like right of publicity cases under the Lanham Act,246 but the
241

Id. at 163
See Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374 (rejecting the Transformative Use Test because it
operates “to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name and identity is in any
way expressive, regardless of its commercial exploitation.”).
243 Hart, 717 F.3d at 164 n.30 (“[T]he Predominant Use Test . . . merely looks to the
expressive ‘value’ of a celebrity’s identity, not its use, vis-à-vis the challenged work.”).
244 Id. at 155–57 (“Adopting [the Rogers Test] would potentially immunize a broad
swath of tortious activity.”); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1280 (9th
Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (“EA argues that we should extend this test, created to
evaluate Lanham Act claims, to apply to right-of-publicity claims because it is ‘less prone
to misinterpretation’ and ‘more protective of free expression’ than the transformative use
defense.”); Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s In the Game: Redefining the Transformative Use
Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 220 (2012) (“A work
can be a complete imitation even if there is no explicit deception present in it. These works,
despite having little to no redeeming creative value on their own would still unquestionably
pass the Rogers Test.”).
245
Hart, 717 F.3d at 155 n.19 (citations omitted); see also id. at 159 (“[W]hile the
Rogers Test was arguably forged in the crucible of trademark law – and the Rogers court
appeared to consult trademark principles for inspiration – the court also pointed out that
the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement
and is therefore potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act . . . . [T]he right of
publicity is broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests.”); see
also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (“Keller’s publicity claim is not founded on an allegation that
consumers are being illegally misled into believing that he is endorsing EA or its
products[,] [but] [i]nstead, Keller’s claim is that EA has appropriated, without permission
and without providing compensation, his talent and years of hard work on the football
field.”); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967 (“Although publicity rights are related to laws
preventing false endorsement, they offer substantially broader protection.”).
246
Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“While the [Rogers] Test may have a use in trademark–like
right of publicity cases, it is inapposite here.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1280
242
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common law right of publicity does not implicate consumer confusion.247
Thus, because the Rogers Test focuses on whether an artistic or literary
work explicitly misleads consumers,248 and because the right of publicity
protects the property and economic interests of the celebrity, not the
consumer,249 the Rogers Test fails to properly weigh celebrities’
commercial rights in their identities.250 Accordingly, Judge Greenaway
properly decided not “to adopt a test that hews so closely to traditional
trademark principles.”251
Contrary to the Rogers Test, the Transformative Use Test provides a
more effective methodology because it “maintains a singular focus on
whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or
likeness.”252 Specifically, the Transformative Use Test’s incorporation of
copyright’s fair use doctrine properly balances the extent of a defendant’s
use of a celebrity’s image against the years of hard work the celebrity
expended in developing his or her marketable identity.253 As a result, this
singular focus analysis properly allows courts to consider “the fact that
misappropriation can occur in any market segment, including those related
to the celebrity” without overreaching by seeking to protect consumers
from the risk of consumer deception, which is adequately protected by
trademark law.254 Accordingly, the Transformative Use Test captures the
(“Although . . . there is some overlap between the transformative use test formulated by
the California Supreme Court and the Rogers test, [the Ninth Circuit] disagree[s] that the
Rogers test should be imported wholesale for right-of-publicity claims.”).
247 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158; accord Keller, 724 F.3d
at 1280 (citations omitted)
(disagreeing “that the Rogers Test should be imported wholesale for right-of-publicity
claims[,]” which is “consistent with the Third Circuit’s rejection of EA’s identical
argument in Hart. As the history and development of the Rogers test makes clear, it was
designed to protect consumers from the risk of consumer confusion – the hallmark element
of a Lanham Act claim[,] [whereas] [t]he right of publicity . . . does not primarily seek to
prevent consumer confusion.”); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A] right of
publicity claim does differ from a false advertising claim in one crucial respect; a right of
publicity claim does not require any evidence that a consumer is likely to be confused.”).
248 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1280.
249 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281.
250 See id. at 1280 (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 399) (discussing the purpose behind
the legal protection afforded to the right of publicity since it “primarily protects a form of
intellectual property [in one’s person] that society deems to have some social utility.”).
251 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158.
252 Id. at 163.
253 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d on other
grounds, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
254 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); see also id. at 157–58
(disagreeing with EA Sport’s argument “that [Hart] should be unable to assert a claim for
appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness was used for
a game about football[,]” because . . . ”[a]dopting this line of reasoning threatens to turn
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intricacies necessary to determine whether a challenged work contains the
creative elements entitled to First Amendment protection or merely an
attempt to misappropriate the economic value generated by a celebrity’s
fame without due compensation.
Because the Third and Ninth Circuits correctly found that the
Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing framework for resolving
the tension underlying the competing interests between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment in the context of video games, Part IV
B turns to the test’s proper formulation and application.
B. Both Majority Opinions in Hart and Keller Properly Formulated and
Applied the Transformative Use Test
i. Formulation of the Transformative Use Test
Before analyzing the proper application of the Transformative Use
Test, it is first necessary to determine the proper formulation of the test in
the video game context. Specifically, the majority and dissenting opinions
in Hart and Keller noted that the threshold issue is whether the
Transformative Use Test considers the other creative elements in the video
game that do not affect or alter the celebrity’s likeness.255 Because the
Transformative Use Test does focus on whether an individual’s likeness
was sufficiently transformed in the creative work as a whole, the primary
focus of this inquiry is the magnitude of how the celebrity’s identity is
transformed in the entire work.256 Thus, the test neither focuses on the
the right of publicity on its head.” The Third Circuit additionally noted that “[i]t cannot be
that the very activity by which [the celebrity] achieved his renown now prevents him from
protecting his hard–won celebrity.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (“The right of
publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer.”).
255 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (“Decisions applying the Transformative Use Test invariably
look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other aspects of a work.”);
see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted) (“The transformative use defense . . . is
a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether
the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”).
256 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (emphasis in original) (“Decisions applying the
Transformative Use Test invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is
altered by other aspects of a work.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n.10 (citation
omitted) (“[O]ne of the factors identified in Comedy III requires an examination of whether
a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy
the expressive work of that artist.”); McCarthy, supra note 46, § 8.27 (“When the accused
work is a story-telling vehicle, . . . the issue is whether the overall ‘personality’ of the
plaintiff has been transformed as it appears in the accused work. Thus, the accused work
must be analyzed as a whole, taking into account not only the visual image, but also the
personality of the accused depiction in the context of the accused work as a whole,
including the story line.”).

2014]

A Collision Course

215

“creative work in the aggregate,”257 nor examines whether the creative
elements “predominate” the work as a whole,258 if the other creative
elements do not affect the context upon which the celebrity’s identity is
altered.259
Judge Ambro’s dissent in Hart argued that the California Supreme
Court’s application of the Transformative Use Test in Comedy III and
Winter showed that the inquiry must focus on how a celebrity’s “likeness
is incorporated into and transformed by the work as a whole[.]”260 In this
regard, Judge Ambro contends that if the work as a whole contains
significant expressive content, then the creative elements taken together
will transform the work.261 This formulation of the Transformative Use
Test, however, is overbroad because such an inquiry considers all the
creative elements in the work, even if those added elements do not affect
a celebrity’s likeness.262 Consequently, applying this overbroad test would
distract courts from the primary focus of the Transformative Test, which
requires courts to determine whether the factual setting of the video game
acted upon a celebrity’s identity in such a way that it transformed it with
some added creativity that is central to a user’s game experience.263
257 Hart, 717 F.3d at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting) ((“The repeated focus on the use of an
individual’s likeness in the context of the work as a whole leaves me little doubt that we
must examine the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it satisfies the
Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment protection.”) (emphasis added)).
258 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ((“The salient question is
whether the entire work is transformative, and whether the transformative elements
predominate, rather than whether an individual persona or image has been altered.”)
(emphasis added)).
259 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 ((“To the extent that [the Comedy III, Winter, and Kirby] cases
considered the broader context of the work (e.g., whether events took place in a ‘fanciful
setting’), this inquiry was aimed at determining whether this context acted upon the
celebrity identity in a way that transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity
beyond providing a ‘merely trivial variation.’”) (emphasis added)); see also Comedy III,
25 Cal. 4th at 407 ((“[A] literal depiction of a celebrity, even if accomplished with great
skill, may still be subject to a right of publicity challenge. The inquiry is in a sense more
quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative
elements predominate in the work.”) (emphasis added)); Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 888–89
(quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408) ((“An artist depicting a celebrity must contribute
something more than a merely trivial variation, but must create something recognizably
his own, in order to qualify for legal protection.”) (quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
260 Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 172–73.
262 See id. at 169 (Greenaway, J., majority) (“Decisions applying the Transformative
Use Test invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other
aspects of a work[,] [and thus] [w]holly unrelated elements do not bear on this inquiry.”).
263 Id. at 169 n.46 (finding “the broader context of NCAA Football does not transform
[Hart’s] likeness into anything other than a digital representation of [Hart] playing the sport
for which he is known, while surrounded by the trappings of real-world competition.”); see
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Accordingly, courts that consider “wholly unrelated elements” that do not
bear on how the celebrity’s identity is used or altered may effectively
eviscerate the legal protection afforded to the right of publicity.264
This is especially problematic when considering the developments in
technology that provide video game companies, such as EA Sports, the
tools to create realistic and detail-oriented video games at low cost.265
also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (concluding Keller’s likeness was not transformed based on
the following considerations: (1) “EA is alleged to have replicated Keller’s physical
characteristics in NCAA Football,” (2) users manipulate the characters in the performance
of the same activity for which they are known in real life—playing football in this case,”
and (3) [t]he context in which the activity occurs is [] similarly realistic – . . . ”realistic
depictions of actual football stadiums in NCAA Football).
264 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (“Acts of blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so
long as the larger work, on balance, contained highly creative elements in great
abundance.”); see also Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406 (listing potentially “transformative
or creative contributions” focused on elements or techniques that affect the celebrity
identity, which encompassed factual reporting, fictionalized portrayal, heavy–handed
lampooning, and subtle social criticism,); Winter, 69 P.3d at 478–79 (noting that “[a]n artist
depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation”
before proceeding to discuss how the Winter brothers’ likenesses were altered directly and
through context); No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011) (finding [t]hat the avatars can be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues
including outer space or to sing songs the real band would object to singing, or that the
avatars appear in the context of a videogame that contains many other creative elements []
does not transform the avatars into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s
members doing exactly what they do as celebrities.”); Hilton, 599 F.3d at 911 (finding that
the Hallmark card and the episode of Hilton’s reality show The Simple Life contained the
same basic setting: “Paris Hilton, born to privilege, working as a waitress.”); ETW Corp.
v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 960 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (finding the
right of publicity trumped the First Amendment because “it [was] clear that the prints gain
their commercial value by exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked
to achieve.”); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360 (D.N.J. 1981)
(acknowledging that the show impersonating Elvis Presley had some informational value
inasmuch as it preserved a live Elvis Presley act for posterity, “[t]his recognition that
defendant’s production has some value does not diminish our conclusion that the primary
purpose of defendant’s activity is to appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of
Elvis Presley.”).
265 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (considering the proper protection afforded to the First
Amendment in the video game context: “Acts of blatant misappropriation . . . [are]
particularly acute in the case of media that lend themselves to easy partition such as video
games” because “[i]t cannot be that content creators escape liability for a work that uses a
celebrity’s unaltered identity in one section but that contains a wholly fanciful creation in
the other, larger section.); see also Neil G. Hood, Note, The First Amendment and New
Media: Video Games As Protected Speech and the Implications For the Right of Publicity,
52 B.C. L. REV. 617, 625 (2011) (“As the technology advanced throughout the 1990s to
present day, this trend of diversification and increased capabilities dramatically
improved.”); Christian Dennie, Tebow Drops Back to Pass: Videogames Have Crossed the
Line, But Does the Right of Publicity Protect a Student–Athlete’s Likeness When Balanced
Against the First Amendment? 62 ARK. L. REV. 645, 646 (2009) (“Videogames depicting
currently enrolled student–athletes are a top priority each year for many fans, alumni, and
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Thus, under Judge Ambro’s Transformative Use Test, although EA Sports
purposely uses an indistinguishable copy of the student-athlete’s identity
performing the same activity for which he is widely recognized, the First
Amendment will protect its video games so long as it adds other creative
or transformative features to the game as a whole. Such a result would not
only incentivize video game developers to appropriate the economic value
of a celebrity’s identity, but it would also create a First Amendment safe
harbor in the context of video games.
Moreover, Judge Thomas’s dissent in Keller argued that the
Transformative Use Test, as set forth in Comedy III, intended a more
“holistic” examination, considering “whether the transformative and
creative elements of a particular work predominate over commercially
based literal or imitative depictions.”266
Applying this holistic
examination analysis, Judge Thomas contended that the Transformative
Use Test should turn on a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the work as a
whole is transformative, examining whether the creative elements
predominate the work at issue, and (2) whether the challenger’s publicity
rights trump the added creative elements to the contested work at issue.267
This formulation of the Transformative Use Test, however, conflicts with
the multiple analytical factors articulated by the California Supreme Court
in Comedy III.268 The purpose of the Transformative Use Test, as noted
by Judge Thomas, is not to deconstruct these five analytical factors in
determining whether a celebrity’s right of publicity outweighs an artist’s
right of free expression.269 Instead, the implicit purpose in Judge Mosk’s
analysis was to provide guidance for courts in balancing the fundamental
tension underlying the rights of free expression and publicity by flexibly
considering the five factors.270

children and have gained Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA) a stronghold on the market for
videogames featuring NCAA student–athletes. These games have evolved substantially
over the course of the last decade and now depict student–athletes in great detail. Due to
the technological advances of the images and likenesses depicted in these videogames,
student–athletes’ rights of publicity have been violated because they have not been
compensated for the use of their images and likenesses.”).
266 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 1285–87.
268 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406–08 (noting the five-factors. It is important to
note, however, that Judge Mosk never explicitly stated that the Transformative Use Test is
limited to these five factors. Instead, these analytical factors provide guidance for courts in
weighing the conflicting interests protected by the First Amendment and right of publicity).
269 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he Transformative Use Test appears to strike the best
balance because it provides courts with a flexible – yet uniformly applicable – analytical
framework.”); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (describing the Transformative
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As a result, a proper consideration of the Transformative Use Test
examines whether the creative elements predominate the work as a
whole,271 but this consideration must be analyzed among the other relevant
factors to properly balance the competing interests at stake. Accordingly,
Judge Thomas’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test would result
in overprotecting the First Amendment because it fails to adequately
consider how the context of a work acts upon, alters or transforms the
celebrity’s likeness in the context of the disputed work.272
In contrast, the correct formulation of the Transformative Use Test
considers the interplay of the five analytical factors in how the work uses,
alters, and/or transforms a celebrity’s identity in the context of other
aspects of the work.273 The critical element to the test’s proper formulation
is that each inquiry must examine how the creative features or elements
affect the artistic visual depiction of a celebrity’s likeness at issue.
Focusing on how the creative elements affect the celebrity’s identity
ensures that the right of publicity maintains it legal force, as intended by
Zacchini.274 Otherwise, crediting a defendant’s creative contributions that
do not affect a celebrity’s likeness would interfere with the calibrated
balancing that the Transformative Use Test requires.275
Even if the commercial value of an artistic visual depiction of a
celebrity’s image derives primarily from such identification, this does not
end the inquiry.276 Rather, the Transformative Use Test also requires
courts to consider the context in which the celebrity’s identity is acted
Use Test as “not a ‘one test fits all’ analysis for any and all possible infringements of the
right of publicity.”).
271 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
272 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169.
273 Id.
274 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (“[I]t is
important to note that neither the public nor [the television station] will be deprived of the
benefit of [the plaintiff’s] performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is
appropriately recognized.”).
275 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 391) (emphasis added) (“We formulate instead what
is essentially a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”); see also Hart, 717 F.3d
at 169 (emphasis in original) (holding that the wholly unrelated elements – that is, the
“other creative elements of NCAA Football” – are not credited as creative elements
pursuant to finding a transformative use because “[t]o hold otherwise could have
deleterious consequences [to the legal protection afforded the right of publicity]” since
“[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the larger work, on
balance, contained highly creative elements in great abundance.”).
276 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410 (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 409) (“[E]ven
literal reproductions of celebrities can be “transformed” into expressive works based on
the context into which the celebrity image is placed.”).
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upon in determining the magnitude of the creative elements that affect how
the celebrity’s identity is used or altered as it is incorporated into the
work.277 In this regard, a work that primarily derives its profit from the
celebrity’s identity may still constitute a transformative use. For instance,
parodies typically satisfy the Transformative Use Test as long as the work
contains “significant transformative elements” relating to a celebrity’s
identity.278 As a result, if courts examine the effect of how a defendant
uses, alters, and/or transforms a celebrity’s identity among the other
creative elements in the work, courts will properly weigh the conflicting
interests.
In sum, when determining whether a work in question is sufficiently
transformative, courts are not required to apply all five of the Comedy III
analytical factors. Rather, courts should apply those factors necessary to
resolve the conflict underlying the right of free speech and the right of
publicity based on the sum of the “significant transformative elements”
that affect the celebrity’s image. The Transformative Use Test therefore
provides a flexible approach in determining whether a celebrity’s right of
publicity outweighs an artist’s right of free expression. Given the
underlying framework of the Transformative Use Test, Part IV B (ii)
discusses the proper application of this balancing test.
ii. Proper Application of the Transformative Use Test
While considering the five analytical factors articulated by the
Comedy III court in the context of video games, the first step in applying
the Transformative Use Test focuses on how the defendant’s video game

277

See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (“[W]hen a work contains significant
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection,
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of
publicity.”); see also Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) (finding the
defendant’s use was transformative because it could “readily ascertain that [the portrayals]
are not just conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive content
other than plaintiffs’ mere likenesses.”); No Doubt., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410 (citing
Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 391) (“[E]ven literal reproductions of celebrities may be
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the context into which the celebrity image is
placed.”).
278 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (citation omitted) (discussing that because “works of
parody . . . are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional
depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect[,] . . . First Amendment
protection of such works outweighs whatever interest the state may have in enforcing the
right of publicity.”).
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uses the celebrity’s identity.279 Applying the first analytical factor in the
video game context, a celebrity’s “identity” encompasses not only his or
her likeness, but also any identifying information that would make it
appear to an ordinary prudent person that the video game character depicts
that celebrity.280 Although courts have held that the First Amendment
protects publicly available information about celebrities,281 the depiction
of a celebrity as a digital avatar in the video game context suggests a
different analysis because the game uses virtual likenesses of actual
celebrities.282 In other words, the recreation of a celebrity’s presence in a
video game as a digital avatar containing public information, such as his
or her biographical information, may still infringe that celebrity’s
likeness.283 Thus, if a video game depicts celebrities as a digital avatar
that merely recreates an imitation of their identities in a separate digital
medium of expression, the video game does not sufficiently transform
those celebrities identities.284 By contrast, if a video game adds
279

See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 164 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977)) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat use did the [defendant] make
of the [celebrity identity]?”).
280 See id at 165 (defining “the term ‘identity’ to encompass not only [the celebrity’s]
likeness, but also his biographical information. It is the combination of these two parts –
which, when combined, identify the digital avatar as an in–game recreation of [the
celebrity] – that must be sufficiently transformed.”).
281 See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a fantasy baseball product that
uses publicly available information is protected by the First Amendment).
282 Hart, 717 F.3d at 165; see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1283(“It is seemingly true that
each likeness is generated largely from publicly available data . . . but finding this fact
dispositive would neuter the right of publicity in our digital world. Computer programmers
with the appropriate expertise can create a realistic likeness of any celebrity using only
publicly available data. If EA creates a virtual likeness of Tom Brady using only publicly
available data – public images and videos of Brady – does EA have free reign to use that
likeness in commercials without violating Brady’s right of publicity? We think not, and
thus must reject [the dissent’s] point about the public availability of much of the data used
given that EA produced and used actual likenesses of the athletes involved.”).
283 See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719, at *22
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“EA’s game provides more than just the players’ names and
statistics; it offers a depiction of the student athletes’ physical characteristics and, as noted,
enables consumers to control the virtual players on a simulated football field[,]” which
“goes far beyond what the court considered in C.B.C. Distribution.”), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1268
(9th Cir. 2013).
284 Id. at 166 (“[T]he digital avatar does closely resemble [Hart]. Not only does the
digital avatar match [Hart] in terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the avatar’s
accessories mimic those worn by [Hart] during his time as a Rutgers player. The
information, as has already been noted, also accurately tracks [Hart’s] vital and
biographical details.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (“EA is alleged to have replicated Keller’s
physical characteristics in NCAA Football . . . ”); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g. Inc., 122
Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding “that the avatars appear in the context
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“significant transformative elements” to celebrities’ virtual likenesses
such that it becomes the developer’s own expression, then those
celebrities’ identities are sufficiently transformed.285 An inquiry focusing
on how creative elements or features affect the identities of celebrities is
consistent with Judge Mosk’s first and second analytical factors because
it considers whether the visual artistic image is a literal depiction of a
particular celebrity or whether it is primarily the defendant’s own
expression.286 Accordingly, the proper first step in applying the
Transformative Use Test in the video game context is to ask how the video
game creator used or altered the celebrity’s identity, focusing on both the
celebrity’s likeness and identifying information.
Under the second step of the Transformative Use Test, even if the
video game uses a realistic depiction of the celebrity as a digital avatar that
merely recreates the celebrity in a digital medium of expression, courts
must next consider how the context of the video game incorporates the
celebrity’s identity.287 Given that this step of the Transformative Use Test
examines the quantitative nature of the creative elements in determining
whether the work is primarily the video game creator’s own expression, or
whether the creative elements merely illustrate a literal depiction of the
celebrity, such analysis is akin to the third and fourth analytical factors
articulated by the Comedy III court.288 When applying this step of the
Transformative Use Test, on the one hand, if the digital avatar depicts
celebrities performing the same activity for which they are known for in
real life, the video game probably does not sufficiently transform those
celebrities’ likenesses.289 On the other hand, if the video game depicts the
of a video game that contains many other creative elements, does not transform the avatars
into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they
do as celebrities.”).
285 See Kirby, Cal. App. 4th at 59 (holding “Ulala is more than a mere likeness or literal
depiction of Kirby,” noting Ulala’s “extremely tall, slender computer-generated physique,”
her “hairstyle and primary costume,” her dance moves, and her role as “a space-age reporter
in the 25th century,” all of which were “unlike any public depiction of Kirby.”).
286 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406 (“[W]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the
‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized . . . . [W]hether a product
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”).
287 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“[L]ooking at how [the celebrity’s] identity is
‘incorporated into and transformed by’ [the video game].”).
288 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 407 (“[W]hether the literal and imitative or the
creative elements predominate in the work . . . [D]oes the marketability and economic value
of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?”).
289 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan
Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football
stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a college football game. This is not transformative;
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celebrity in a setting that is not similar to that in which the celebrity is
known, courts will probably find the context acted upon the celebrity in a
way that sufficiently transformed the celebrity’s identity.290 Thus, the
second step of the Transformative Use Test turns on the magnitude of how
the celebrity’s identity is used or altered as it is incorporated in the video
game.
The application of the third and final step depends on whether the
user’s ability to alter the celebrity’s avatar constitutes a transformative
use.291 In other words, can video game developers satisfy the
Transformative Use Test by creating a feature that allows the video game
user to alter the celebrity’s digital avatar appearance.292 Consistent with
the fifth analytical factor of the Transformative Use Test, the focus of this
inquiry turns on whether the interactive feature is a mere pretext by video
game developers to commercially exploit celebrities’ fame or whether the
interactive features transform those celebrities’ images so it becomes
video game developers own creative expression.293 Video game
developers argue that the user’s ability to alter the celebrity’s avatar
constitutes a creative element protected by the First Amendment because
this feature acts in conjunction with the other creative features in the game.
Thus, the alteration feature constitutes “one of the ‘raw materials’ from

the various digitized sights and sounds in the video game do not alter or transform the
[Hart’s] identity in a significant way.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (citation omitted)(“Keller
is represented as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State and Nebraska, and
the game’s setting is identical to where the public found [Keller] during his collegiate
career: on the football field.”); No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–11 (“[N]o matter what
else occurs in the game during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars perform
rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and maintains its fame.”).
290 See Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 890, 892 (Cal. 2003) (“To the extent the
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes
of lampoon, parody, or caricature[,]” and thus, “DC Comics depicting fanciful, creative
characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers.”).; Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59 (“[T]he
the setting for the game that features Ulala – as a space-age reporter in the 25th century –
is unlike any public depiction of Kirby”.
291 Compare Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (finding “a third avatar-specific element is also
present: the users’ ability to alter the avatar’s appearance.”), with No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 410 (noting that the digital avatars representing No Doubt were “at all times
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians”).
292 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (determining “to what extent the ability to alter a digital
avatar represents a transformative use of [Hart’s] identity” constitutes a transformative
use”).
293 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408 (“[W]hen an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist’s right of free expression is outweighed
by the right of publicity.”).
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which an original work is synthesized . . . [rather than] the very sum and
substance of the work in question.”294
The proper application of the Transformative Use Test, however,
does not hold interactivity as an end onto itself. Rather, the balancing
inquiry requires courts to determine whether the interests protected by the
right of publicity are sufficient to overcome the already-existing First
Amendment protections.295 As Zacchini illustrated in the context of a
newscast broadcasting, the right of publicity can trump another’s First
Amendment interest in situations where the dissemination of such
expression receives strong First Amendment protection.296 If courts found
an interactive feature allowing a user to alter a digital avatar as an end onto
itself and thus, satisfying the Transformative Use Test, the result would
create a safe harbor that would destroy the legal protection afforded to
publicity rights.297 Consequently, video game developers would not bear
any legal liability for diluting as much commercial value of celebrities’
likenesses as they desire.298 The Transformative Use Test, therefore,
cannot hold that the First Amendment protects a video game by merely
including a particular interactive feature, such as the users’ ability to alter
the digital avatar’s appearance.299
Instead, in determining whether the degree of interactivity to alter a
digital avatar’s appearance sufficiently transforms that celebrity’s
294 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166–69; see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1277 (“EA suggests that the
fact that NCAA Football users can alter the characteristics of the avatars in the game is
significant.”); Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406.
295 Hart, 717 F.3d at 167; see also id. at 170 n.47 (summarizing the Transformative Use
Test’s proper inquiry in balancing the First Amendment and the right of publicity: “[The
Third Circuit’s] inquiry looked to whether other interests may surmount the First
Amendment protection – as they can surmount protections for other modes of expression.
In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy the Transformative Use Test, [the Third
Circuit] do[es] not hold that the game loses First Amendment protection[,] [but
rather,] . . . the interest protected by the right of publicity in this case outweighs the
Constitutional shield.”).
296
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
297 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 n.39 (“It is no answer to say that digitizing [Hart’s]
appearance in and of itself works a transformative use. Recreating a celebrity’s likeness or
identity in some medium other than photographs or video cannot, without more, satisfy the
test; this would turn the inquiry on its head – and would contradict the very basis for the
Transformative Use Test.”).
298 See id. at 166 (“If the mere presence of the [interactive] feature were enough, video
game companies could commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to absolve
themselves by including a feature that allows users to modify the digital likenesses.”); see
also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n.10 (citing McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:72; Comedy III,
25 Cal. 4th at 406) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[O]ne of the factors identified in
Comedy III requires an examination of whether a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is
to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work of that artist.”).
299 Hart, 717 F.3d at 167.
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likeness, courts must determine, as a threshold matter in applying the third
step, whether the celebrity’s unaltered likeness or default position is an
essential element to the user’s game experience.300 If the celebrity’s
unaltered likeness is a critical element to the user’s game experience, as
was the case in Hart and Keller because the video games replicated both
college football players performing the same activity for which they were
known in real life,301 a court should not credit the user’s ability to alter the
digital avatar as a “significant transformative element,” which would in
turn support a finding of a transformative use.302
Crediting users’ ability to alter the appearances of digital avatars as
a transformative element would be illogical when the realistic depiction of
the “unaltered likeness is central to the core of the game experience”
because such users will be discouraged from using this interactive
feature.303 For instance, because the realistic depictions of Hart and
Keller’s default appearances in NCAA Football were critical elements to
users’ game experience, users would be disinclined to alter their likenesses
because such realism “permit[s] users to recreate the setting of a bitter
defeat and, in effect, achieve some cathartic readjustment of history.”304
Therefore, the expressive value of allowing users to alter the players’
digital avatars in games such as NCAA Football is minimal, which
indicates that such feature fails to add “something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.”305
In contrast, if the celebrity’s unaltered likeness is not an essential
element to the users game experience, an interactive feature that allows
users to alter the digital avatar’s appearance shall be credited as “one of
the ‘raw materials’ from which the broader game is constructed.”306 As
300

Id. at 168.
Id. at 167; see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 ((affirming the district court’s ruling
that “Keller is represented as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State and
Nebraska, and the game’s setting is identical to where the public found [Keller] during his
collegiate career: on the football field.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
302 Hart, 717 F.3d at 168.
303 Id.; see also No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g. Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011) (“Activision’s use of lifelike depictions of No Doubt performing songs is
motivated by the commercial interest in using the band’s fame to market Band Hero,
because it encourages the band’s sizeable fan base to purchase the game so as to perform
as, or alongside, the members of No Doubt.”).
304 Hart, 717 F.3d at 168.
305 Id.
306 See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 61 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (finding that “Ulala is a ‘fanciful, creative character’ who exists in the context of a
unique and expressive video game.”); Winter 69 P.3d at 479 (finding that the defendant’s
301
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indicated in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., for example, if a video game
depicts a space-age reporter in the 25th century, which is unlike a public
depiction of a popular singer, such alleged use constitutes a significant
creative element.307
Thus, in the video game context, a court must make a threshold
determination as to whether the celebrity’s unaltered or default digital
avatar “is central to the core of the game experience” when either crediting
or discrediting the user’s ability to alter the avatar’s appearance as a
transformative element.308 In other words, if the enjoyment of the game
remains “in the users’ ability to play ‘as, or alongside’ their preferred
players or team,”309 any modification to the avatar will not constitute a
“significant transformative element” that supports a transformative use
defense. However, this determination of whether or not the celebrity’s
unaltered appearance is an essential element to a user’s game experience
should not be dispositive. Instead, the ability to alter a digital avatar is
merely another factor to consider in resolving the tension between the right
of publicity and the First Amendment.310
Therefore, this threshold determination should turn on whether users,
in fact, desire the ability to alter a celebrity’s digital avatar. In making this
determination, courts should survey a sufficient sample of users to
establish whether the celebrity’s unaltered appearance is an essential
element to that particular video game. If the quantity of users using the
interactive feature to alter a celebrity’s avatar is statistically insignificant
or insubstantial, courts will find that celebrity’s unaltered likeness is an
essential element to a user’s game experience. In such instances, courts
will not credit the interactive feature as a “significant creative element.”
Statistically, if, however, a substantial quantity of users use the interactive
feature, then a court should find that celebrity’s unaltered likeness is not
an essential element. Under these circumstances, courts will credit such an
alteration feature as a “significant creative element,” which thereby
supports a finding of a transformative use. Accordingly, in applying the
final step of the Transformative Use Test, courts should ask whether the
artistic depictions satisfied the Transformative Use Test because the defendant’s
“depict[ed] fanciful, creative characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers.”); Keller, 724
F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
307 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59.
308 Hart, 717 F.3d at 168.
309 Id. at 169 (quoting No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 411).
310 Id. at 168 n.45 (“Admittedly, just as the presence of a photorealistic depiction of a
celebrity cannot be the end of the inquiry, the mere fact that [Hart’s] likeness is the default
appearance of the avatar cannot, without more, end our analysis” because “[i]t is merely
another factor to consider in the balancing exercise.”).
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type and extent of the video game’s interactivity sufficiently transforms
the celebrity’s likeness to the extent the celebrity’s appearance is not
essential to the core of the users’ game experience.311
To summarize, the proper application of the Transformative Use Test
in the video game context requires courts to first consider how the
defendant’s video game uses the celebrity’s identity. After focusing on
the use of the celebrity’s identity, including his or her appearance and other
relevant information associated with the celebrity, courts should then
consider how the context of the video game incorporates the celebrity’s
identity. Finally, if a video game contains an interactive feature, a court
must examine whether the type and degree of interactivity that affects the
celebrity’s likeness is an essential element to users’ game experience.
Courts must examine all three steps independently, while also ignoring
“wholly unrelated elements” that fail to act upon or affect the celebrity’s
identity.
V. CONCLUSION
As intellectual property rights (including the right of publicity) have
expanded, defining the scope of protected speech under the First
Amendment has become very complex. Courts have used a variety of
balancing tests, including an ad-hoc approach, the Predominant Use Test,
the trademark-based Rogers Test, and the copyright-based Transformative
Use Test, in weighing these competing interests.
Both the Third and Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment when two former college
football players sought legal relief from EA Sports for misappropriating
their likeness without their consent in EA Sports’s NCAA Football video
games series. In determining the proper analytical framework for
balancing the former college football players’ right of publicity against EA
Sports’s right to free speech, both circuits properly agreed that the
Transformative Use Test provided the best balancing test.
In applying the Transformative Use Test, both circuits noted how
technological innovation allowed video game companies to develop
realistic games that included depictions that virtually resembled the former
student-athletes. Consequently, although video games may contain
“significant creative elements” as a whole, these creative features are
insufficient by themselves to constitute the kinds of expressive speech that
the First Amendment intended to protect. Instead, the Transformative Use
Test requires video game developers to transform the identity or likeness
of celebrities depicted within the context of the video game. Thus, the
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focus of applying the Transformative Use Test remains to be on how other
aspects of the game use the identity or likeness of the celebrity.
If the application of the Transformative Use Test considers “wholly
unrelated elements” that are not essential to users’ game experience, the
right of publicity would no longer have any legal effect in the video game
context. Since this result would give video game developers a license to
misappropriate a valuable property right, it is imperative that future courts
applying the Transformative Use Test in the context of video games to
disregard creative elements that are not central to the core of the game
experience; thus fail to act upon the identity of the celebrity.
The majority decisions in Hart and Keller came to the correct
conclusion in holding that EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series
did not sufficiently transform the particular student-athletes’ likenesses
because the game depicted these former college football players’
identically performing the same activity for which they were recognized
in real life. Because the creative elements depicted in EA Sports’s video
games involved elements that failed to transform the identities of the
players and were not essential to users’ game experience, the Third and
Ninth Circuit’s correctly disregarded such elements. Accordingly, the
Third and Ninth Circuit decisions serve as valuable precedent for resolving
the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment in the
video game context by providing greater clarity in balancing these
competing interests that has caused great debate and flux since its
inception in Zacchini.

